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Notes 
JUST A LITTLE TALK WITH JESUS:  
REACHING THE LIMITS OF THE LEGISLATIVE 
PRAYER EXCEPTION 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Now let us have a little talk with Jesus 
Let us tell Him about our troubles 
He will hear our faintest cry 
He will answer by and by 
Now when you feel a little prayer wheel turning 
And you know a little fire is burning 
You will find a little talk with Jesus makes it right1 
Thus on April 5, 2005, began the legal battle over prayer offered at 
the opening of the Indiana House Legislative sessions.2  The Speaker of 
the Indiana House of Representatives, Brian Bosma, was keenly aware of 
objections to the overtly Christian content of the prayers invoked each 
meeting day at the opening of the House legislative sessions.3  He 
nonetheless invited Reverend Brown, who had delivered the opening 
prayer earlier that day, back into the Speaker’s stand to “bless us with a 
song.”4  Reverend Brown proceeded to sing “Just a Little Talk with 
Jesus” while several legislators, staff, and visitors stood, clapped, and 
                                                 
1 CLEVANT DERRICKS, Just a Little Talk with Jesus, http://www.preciouslordtakemyhand. 
com/christianhymns/justalittletalk.html (last visited Aug. 25, 2007). 
2 Hinrichs v. Bosma, 400 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1107 (S.D. Ind. 2005). 
3 Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 8, Hinrichs v. Bosma, Nos. 05-4604, 05-4781 (7th Cir. 
May 15, 2006) (he refuses “to actively or passively censor prayers by informing clergy and 
members of the House that they cannot pray in accordance with the dictates of their 
conscience.”). 
4 Hinrichs, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 1103.  The remaining lyrics of the song are as follows: 
Sometimes my path seems dreary without a ray of cheer 
And then the cloud about me hides the light of day 
The mists in me rise and hide the stormy skies 
But just a little talk with Jesus clears the way 
. . . 
I may have doubts and fears, my eyes be filled with tears 
But Jesus is a freind [sic.] who watches day and night 
I go to Him in prayer, He knows my every care 
And just a little talk with Jesus makes it right 
. . . 
You will find a little talk with Jesus makes it right 
Makes everything right 
DERRICKS, supra note 1. 
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sang along.5  Other members of the House walked out, offended by this 
sectarian religious display during the legislative session.6  With such 
objections apparently past the tipping point, a lawsuit ensued against the 
Speaker, challenging the Christian nature of most of the prayers offered 
during the last session.7   
The first round of this battle over the legislative prayer content in the 
Indiana House of Representatives ended in favor of the plaintiffs when 
the Federal District Court for the Southern District of Indiana issued an 
injunction requiring the Speaker to advise the persons offering prayer to 
keep the content nonsectarian.8  However, Speaker Bosma refused to 
carry out the court’s order, choosing to forego the usual opening prayer 
rather than comply.9  He prefered allowing sectarian prayers, as in the 
                                                 
5 Hinrichs, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 1107.  See also Eddie Baeb, Indiana’s Christians to Fight 
Ruling, BUFFALO NEWS (New York), Dec. 15, 2005, at A9 (asserting that this song performed 
by the Baptist church elder was the source of the subsequent lawsuit). 
6 Hinrichs, 400 F. Supp. 2d. at 1107. 
7 Id. at 1108.  Like most Hoosiers, all four plaintiffs are Christians.  Baeb, supra note 5 
(“About 82 percent of Indiana identifies itself as Christian and less than 1 percent as Jewish 
or Muslim, an Indiana University poll in 2004 showed.”). 
8 Hinrichs, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 1131.  See also Patricia Manson, Lawmaker Wants Relief for 
Prayer, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Sept. 5, 2006, at 3.  Explaining the order and the Speakers 
reaction to it: 
The injunction directed the speaker to tell anyone delivering such a 
prayer that it must be nonsectarian and must not refer to Jesus Christ 
or be used to proselytize or advance any other faith or belief. 
Contending that the injunction required the censorship of Christian 
invocations, Bosma halted the 188-year practice of opening House 
sessions with a prayer. 
Id.  (internal quotes omitted). 
9 See Mike Smith, Statehouse Prayer Offered – Unofficially, FORT WAYNE NEWS SENTINEL, 
Jan. 5, 2006, at L1.  To comply with the court order, without actually carrying out its 
directive to advise those invited to deliver the prayer, the Speaker has, in essence, taken his 
ball home rather than play by the rules.  Id.  At the start of the 2006 legislative session, 
Bosma gathered several members of the House in the back of the chamber for an informal, 
voluntary prayer session.  Id.  Representative Eric Turner offered the following prayer: 
Father, we thank you for sending your son to be a model for our lives 
. . . Help us to be Christlike in all that we do, in our interactions with 
one another as we represent our constituents back home.  As we walk 
and talk, help us to be Christlike.  Father, we just pray these things in 
the name of our Lord and our Savior, Jesus Christ. 
Id.  Afterward, many members applauded.  Id.  The news report continues: 
Bosma said that because the prayers preceded official business, were 
said in the back of the chamber and were completely voluntary, they 
complied with the court order.  He said he still believes [the district 
court]’s ruling tramples on free speech and plans to appeal it to the 7th 
U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals.  For now, he will continue the new 
practice. 
Id. 
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2005 session, even though those were held to violate the First 
Amendment’s Establishment Clause.10 
The embattled Indiana Legislature is not alone.  The Tangipahoa 
Parish School Board is currently facing its third Establishment Clause 
lawsuit in the past decade.11  For the past thirty years, the Board, which 
meets twice a month at the Parish School System Central Offices,  has 
                                                                                                             
 “We are a nation of laws, even laws that we disagree with,” Bosma said.  Id.  Speaker 
Bosma seems confused about the nature of the speech in question: the voluntary prayers in 
the back of the chamber that preceded the official business of the House were not state 
invocations.  Id.  The legal director of Indiana’s ACLU, Kenneth Falk, who represents the 
plaintiffs, said of the prayer, “I don’t see this as legislative prayer.  This appears to be the 
private prayers of legislators, which they certainly have a right to do.”  Id.  See also Manson, 
supra note 8.  Falk is again quoted on the difference between the prayers: 
The prayers being delivered to initiate sessions of the Indiana House of 
Representatives are delivered with the authorization of the speaker by 
invited officiants to give the prayers as part of the official agenda of 
the House of Representatives . . . These prayers represent government 
speech subject to the establishment clause, not private speech 
protected by the free speech and free exercise clauses of the First 
Amendment. 
Id. 
10 Smith, supra note 9.  Speaker Bosma was vocal about his discontent with the federal 
judge’s ruling.  Id.  See also Cory Havens, Prayer Returns to House, SOUTH BEND TRIB., Jan. 9, 
2007, at A1: 
Speaker of the House B. Patrick Bauer, D-South Bend, began Monday’s 
opening session of the Indiana House of Representatives for 2007 with 
a prayer. 
 . . . 
Before leading the House in prayer, Bauer explained that, while 
awaiting the latest ruling in the suit, he would use a script he prepared 
in consultation with the attorney general’s office to avoid violating the 
court’s order. 
 . . . 
He said it was important to return the prayer to the front of the 
chamber. 
Id.  at A1, A6.  The scripted nonsectarian prayer Bauer read was as follows: 
Almighty God, we come before you today humbled by the magnitude 
of the responsibilities of this office.  May you help us to realize that 
those who have been given the greatest responsibility need the greatest 
guidance.  We pray you will show us what is good, and what is 
required of us.  We pray for your insight, your compassion, and your 
strength.  Amen. 
Id. at A1. 
11 Doe v. Tangipahoa Parish Sch. Bd. (Tangipahoa Parish I), No. Civ.A. 03-2870, 2005 WL 
517341 (E.D. La. Feb. 24, 2005); Debra Lemoine, Judge Gets Arguments on School Board 
Meeting Prayers, BATON ROUGE ADVOC., Sept. 10, 2004, at 1.  The School Board lost one of 
the lawsuits concerning a policy which directed teachers to read a disclaimer to students 
before teaching evolution.  Lemoine, supra, at 1.  The second lawsuit challenged lunchtime 
prayer meetings held by ministers on school property and was settled.  Id. 
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opened each meeting with an invocation.12  The School Board asserts its 
classification as a deliberative body permitted use of prayer by the same 
exception to the Establishment Clause allowed for state and national 
legislative bodies.13   
Much like the Indiana controversy, the Federal District Court for the 
Eastern District of Louisiana declared the School Board’s practice a 
violation of the Establishment Clause.14  On appeal, however, the Fifth 
Circuit panel split three ways, producing three separate opinions, each 
with its unique analysis.15  Thus, the question of how a local government 
body can expect any proffered prayers to be regarded in the Fifth Circuit 
remains unanswered.16 
Federal courts across the country are embroiled in disputes 
involving the use of prayer to open sessions for deliberative legislative 
and administrative bodies at all levels of government, local to national.17  
This growing body of case law relies almost exclusively on a 1983 
Supreme Court decision, Marsh v. Chambers, which addressed state 
legislative prayer.18  This Note proposes a judicial doctrine which would 
give clear guidance to judges regarding the use of prayer by deliberative 
bodies.  First, this Note provides the history of legislative prayer, the 
Supreme Court’s decision creating a blanket exception permitting its use, 
                                                 
12 Doe v. Tangipahoa Parish Sch. Bd. (Tangipahoa Parish II), 477 F.3d 188, 192 (5th Cir. 
2006). 
13 Id. at 202.  See also Lemoine, supra note 11, at 1 (describing the organization and 
effectiveness of the local conservative Christian churches and their members, forming the 
Christian Community Network).  The Network’s goal is “to promote Christian values in all 
aspects of community life, not just public schools . . . .”  Id.  The Network succeeded in 
electing local Christian leaders, including a minister, to the nine-member School Board.  Id.  
One School Board member denies pushing prayer on anyone, stating, “. . . We believe it is 
our freedom of religion, not freedom from religion . . . .”  Id.  Notably, however, no prayers 
from any other faiths have ever been offered at the meetings.  Id. 
14 Tangipahoa Parish I, 2005 WL 517341, at *11. 
15 See Tangipahoa Parish II, 477 F.3d at 188. 
16 See Laura Maggi, Board Prayer Improper, Judges Say But Nonsectarian One May Work, 
NEW ORLEANS TIMES PICAYUNE, Dec. 17, 2006, at 1.  The split decision “left open questions 
that could lead either side to appeal or to ask for a hearing before the full 5th U.S. Circuit 
Court of Appeals.”  Id. 
17 See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983).  See also infra Part II.A (discussing the 
history of legislative prayer). 
18 Marsh, 463 U.S. at 783.  Contra Coles v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 171 F.3d 369 (6th Cir. 
1999) (holding that the school board’s practice of opening its meetings with a prayer is not 
comparable to legislative prayer).  This case is the singular exception involving deliberative 
bodies.  Contra North Carolina Civil Liberties Union Legal Found. v. Constangy, 947 F.2d 
1145 (4th Cir. 1991) (holding that a state court judge’s practice of beginning court sessions 
with a prayer violated the Establishment Clause). 
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and the evolution of lower court cases such prayer has generated.19  
Second, this Note identifies the trend to test the limits of the Court’s 
single legislative prayer holding, notes the ambiguities in its application, 
and highlights the need for the exception to be readdressed.20  Third, this 
Note proposes a judicial doctrine that provides clear limits for legislative 
prayer by requiring the content to remain nonsectarian and forbidding 
the blanket application to all levels of government.21  This simple, 
proposed doctrine would save communities time and money currently 
spent on these controversies, as well as avoid the attending divisiveness 
such religious disagreements produce. 
II.  LEGISLATIVE PRAYER:  ITS HISTORY, JURISPRUDENCE, AND CURRENT 
STATUS 
The unique balance that the First Amendment creates between the 
Religion Clauses has resulted in an array of doctrines and tests that 
apply to the many situations where church and state collide.22  When 
government is the speaker and its speech includes prayer, three schools 
of thought exist with regard to content and location:  strict separation, 
neutrality, and accommodation.23  The limited guidance regarding what 
prayer content is acceptable by whom may cause confusion and, 
perhaps, leave religious minorities unprotected.24  First, this Part offers a 
history of legislative prayer from its beginning in the First Congress 
through the Supreme Court’s sole decision on this subject.25  Second, this 
Part discusses lower courts’ subsequent applications of the Supreme 
                                                 
19 See infra Part II. 
20 See infra Part III. 
21 See infra Part IV. 
22 See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 12.2.1 (2d 
ed. 2002).  The First Amendment begins: “Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . .”  U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
23 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 22, at § 12.2.1.  The theory of strict separation posits that 
government should be entirely secular, with religion entirely a private aspect of society.  Id. 
at 1149.  The theory of neutrality suggests that government remain neutral toward religion, 
without favoring either religion over non-religion or one religion over others.  Id. at 1151.  
The accommodation theory interprets the Establishment Clause to forbid government from 
literally establishing a church, coercing religious participation, or favoring one religion 
over others.  Id. at 1153.  In addition, because government is the speaker, legislative prayer 
poses no conflict with the Free Exercise clause, which protects an individual right, and the 
question in all cases discussing legislative prayer turns on whether the government is 
advancing religion or entangled with religion.  Id. at § 12.2.6. 
24 See, e.g., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (describing how easy it is for the religious 
majority to fail to notice the coercive effects of practices which reflect their own religious 
traditions). 
25 See infra Part II.A. 
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Court’s holding.26  Finally, this Part explores two current conflicts 
involving legislative prayer.27 
A. History of Legislative Prayer 
Legislative prayer has a long history in America.28  Just three days 
after the First Congress authorized appointment of paid chaplains for the 
House and Senate, it approved the Bill of Rights, including the 
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment which succinctly forbade 
government establishment of religion.29  In deciding Religion Clause 
cases, courts often consider the decisions and communications at the 
time these constitutional provisions were adopted in an effort to 
ascertain the Founders’ intent.30  Historians interpret the Founders’ 
                                                 
26 See infra Part II.B. 
27 See infra Part II.C. 
28 Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 787 (1983).  In 1774, the Continental Congress began 
the tradition of opening sessions with a prayer.  Id.  After the Constitutional Convention, 
the First Congress began the policy of selecting a chaplain for the opening prayer.  Id. 
29 Id. at 788 (“Clearly the men who wrote the First Amendment Religion Clauses did not 
view paid legislative chaplains and opening prayers as a violation of that Amendment, for 
the practice of opening sessions with prayer has continued without interruption ever since 
that early session of Congress.”).  But history is not without its dissenters.  See NOAH 
FELDMAN, DIVIDED BY GOD 247 (2005) (“Madison himself understood that paying the 
chaplains of the House and Senate out of public funds was a constitutional anomaly, and 
he wisely suggested that the Congress ought to pay for their services from their own 
pockets.”).  As President, Madison recommended at least four days of national prayer and 
thanksgiving and oversaw federal funding for both congressional and military chaplains 
and missionaries charged with converting the Indians to Christianity.  Patrick M. Garry, 
Religious Freedom Deserves More Than Neutrality: The Constitutional Argument for 
Nonpreferential Favoritism of Religion, 57 FLA. L. REV. 1, 20 (2005). 
30 DARIEN A. MCWHIRTER, THE SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 6 (1994).  The 
handling of church and state issues soon after the Bill of Rights was adopted into the 
Constitution is also telling of what the authors had in mind.  Id.  Two of the Founders’ 
actions and words are most heavily relied upon: James Madison and Thomas Jefferson.  Id. 
at 4.  Madison proposed the set of twelve amendments at the first session of the first 
Congress, which were modified by the House and Senate and passed as the ten 
amendments of the Bill of Rights.  Id.  Shortly following the Bill of Rights’ adoption, 
Jefferson  wrote what may be the most quoted statement concerning the meaning of the 
religion clauses of the First Amendment: 
Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely between 
man and his God; that he owes account to none other for his faith or 
his worship; that the legislative powers of the government reach 
actions only, and not opinions, I contemplate with sovereign reverence 
that act of the whole American people which declared that their 
legislature should “make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,” thus building a wall 
of separation between church and State.  Adhering to this expression 
of the supreme will of the nation in behalf of the rights of conscience, I 
shall see with sincere satisfaction the progress of those sentiments 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 42, No. 1 [2007], Art. 6
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intent using available records, attempting to reconcile the contradiction 
of the Establishment Clause with the paid chaplains.31  Federalism was 
an important issue for the First Congress, and several states at the time 
recognized and used taxes to support established churches.32  The 
Fourteenth Amendment, which makes the Establishment Clause 
applicable to the states, did not exist when the Bill of Rights was 
originally approved.33  Thus, historical context, while limited in its 
                                                                                                             
which tend to restore man to all of his natural rights, convinced he has 
no natural right in opposition to his social duties. 
Id. at 4.  See also Kurt T. Lash, Power and the Subject of Religion, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1069 (1998). 
31 See, e.g., MICHAEL J. MALBIN, RELIGION AND POLITICS: THE INTENTIONS OF THE AUTHORS 
OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 15-16 (1978).  The author sums up the hopes of the Founders: 
What should be emphasized here is the broad area of agreement 
between Madison and the others in the First Congress.  They all 
wanted religion to flourish, but they all wanted a secular government.  
They all thought a multiplicity of sects would help prevent domination 
by any one sect.  All of them also thought religion was useful, perhaps 
even necessary, for teaching morality.  They all thought a free republic 
needed citizens who had a moral education.  They all thought the 
primary responsibility for this education lay with the states.  And they 
all agreed that Article I gave Congress no direct power to deal with the 
subject.  The disagreement was over what Congress should be allowed 
to do pursuant to some other delegated power. 
Id. at 17. 
32 MARK DOUGLAS MCGARVIE, ONE NATION UNDER LAW: AMERICA’S EARLY NATIONAL 
STRUGGLES TO SEPARATE CHURCH AND STATE 13 (2004). 
33 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.  But see Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 678-79 
(2002) (Thomas, J., concurring).  Justice Thomas stated: 
When rights are incorporated against the States through the 
Fourteenth Amendment they should advance, not constrain, 
individual liberty. 
 Consequently, in the context of the Establishment Clause, it may 
well be that state action should be evaluated on different terms than 
similar action by the Federal Government . . .  Thus, while the Federal 
Government may ‘make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion,’ the States may pass laws that include or touch on religious 
matters so long as these laws do not impede free exercise rights or any 
other individual religious liberty interest. By considering the particular 
religious liberty right alleged to be invaded by a State, federal courts 
can strike a proper balance between the demands of the Fourteenth 
Amendment on the one hand and the federalism prerogatives of States 
on the other. 
Id.  Justice Thomas reiterates his position as to incorporation of the Establishment Clause 
even more clearly in Elk Grove Village Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow two years later.  542 U.S. 
1, 49 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring) (citation omitted.), two years later.  He stated: 
I accept that the Free Exercise Clause, which clearly protects an 
individual right, applies against the States through the Fourteenth 
Amendment. . . But the Establishment Clause is another matter. The 
text and history of the Establishment Clause strongly suggest that it is 
a federalism provision intended to prevent Congress from interfering 
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modern applicability, reveals that the Founding Fathers saw no real 
threat to the Establishment Clause through the use of legislative prayer.34  
Only once has the Supreme Court addressed this issue squarely, 
recognizing a special exception to the usual Establishment Clause 
doctrines for legislative prayer in Marsh v. Chambers.35  The Court 
examined the Nebraska legislature’s 100-year-old practice of employing 
a chaplain to open the daily legislative session with a prayer.36  The long-
                                                                                                             
with state establishments. Thus, unlike the Free Exercise Clause, which 
does protect an individual right, it makes little sense to incorporate the 
Establishment Clause. 
Id. 
34 See Marsh, 463 U.S. at 790-91.  However, there have been colossal changes in the 
country since the adoption of the First Amendment.  See Sch. Dist. Of Abington Township, 
Pa. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 240 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring) (“[O]ur religious 
composition makes us a vastly more diverse people than were our forefathers. They knew 
differences chiefly among Protestant sects. Today the Nation is far more heterogeneous 
religiously, including as it does substantial minorities not only of Catholics and Jews but as 
well of those who worship according to no version of the Bible and those who worship no 
God at all.”) 
35 Marsh, 463 U.S. at 783.  The Court chose not to apply other Establishment Clause 
doctrines available at the time.  See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (establishing 
the Lemon test in finding that state aid to nonpublic schools did not have a secular purpose, 
a primary effect which neither advances nor inhibits religion, nor did it foster excessive 
government entanglement with religion); see also Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) 
(O’Connor concurrence) (establishing the endorsement test analyzing a city’s display of a 
nativity scene and finding that the city did not symbolically endorse a particular religion 
through the display).  Since the decision in Marsh, other possible doctrines have emerged.  
See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995) (establishing 
the neutrality test through the government’s similar treatment of religious and secular 
groups); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (establishing the coercion test through the 
finding that prayers at public school graduations are inherently coercive because there is 
great pressure on students to attend their graduation ceremonies and to not leave during 
the prayer). 
36 Marsh, 463 U.S. at 784.  Robert E. Palmer, a Presbyterian minister, served as the 
chaplain since 1965, sixteen years before the time the case was heard by the Court, at a 
salary of $319.75 per month for each month that the legislature was in session.  Id. at 785.  
The chaplain’s prayers included explicitly Christian references for the first fifteen years of 
his tenure.  Id. at 824 n.2 (Stevens dissent).  An example of such prayer is the following, 
given by Palmer on March 20, 1978: 
Father in heaven, the suffering and death of your son brought life to 
the whole world moving our hearts to praise your glory.  The power of 
the cross reveals your concern for the world and the wonder of Christ 
crucified. 
The days of his life-giving death and glorious resurrection are 
approaching.  This is the hour when he triumphed over Satan’s pride; 
the time when we celebrate the great event of our redemption.  We are 
reminded of the price he paid when we pray with the Psalmist: 
My God, my God, why have you forsaken me, far from my prayer, 
from the words of my cry?  O my God, I cry out by day, and you 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 42, No. 1 [2007], Art. 6
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term use of a single Christian minister was acceptable absent proof of 
impermissible motive.37  Paying the chaplain from state funds did not 
violate the Establishment Clause in view of the historical tradition of 
paid legislative chaplains.38  The question concerning the content of the 
prayers in the Judeo-Christian tradition, which becomes more relevant in 
subsequent disputes, was not of concern because there was “no 
indication that the prayer opportunity has been exploited to proselytize 
or advance any one, or disparage any other, faith or belief.”39  Indeed, 
the Court expressed a reluctance to dissect particular prayers in an effort 
to assess their constitutionality.40 
                                                                                                             
answer not; by night, and there is no relief for me.  Yet you are 
enthroned in the Holy Place, O glory of Israel?  In you our fathers 
trusted; they trusted, and you delivered them.  To you they cried, and 
they escaped; in you they trusted, and they were not put to shame.  
But I am a worm, not a man; the scorn of men, despised by the people.  
All who see me scoff at me; they mock me with parted lips, they wag 
their heads: He relied on the Lord; let Him deliver him, let Him rescue 
him, if He loves him.  Amen. 
Id.  A previous complaint from a Jewish legislator in 1980 led Palmer to remove all 
references to Christ.  Id. at 793 n.14. 
37 Id. at 793-94.  No impermissible motive was found because Palmer’s reappointment 
was related to the acceptability of his performance and personal qualities.  Id. at 793.  In 
addition, guest chaplains substituted for Palmer during absences or at the request of 
legislators.  Id. 
38 Marsh, 463 U.S. at 794.  More recently the Court has relied heavily on history and 
tradition in deciding other Establishment Clause cases.  In Van Orden v. Perry, Justice 
Breyer’s swing vote held that a granite monument bearing the Ten Commandments on the 
grounds of the Texas Statehouse could remain due to its almost fifty-year, unchallenged 
residency in that location.  Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring).  
But see McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844 (2005) (finding more recent placement of 
Ten Commandments and attempting to add historical relevance to display fails to satisfy 
reliance on history and tradition).  These tandem cases concerning display of the Ten 
Commandments reflect similar reasoning as was applied in Marsh to the long-term service 
of the legislative chaplain with no impermissible motive discernable.  Marsh, 463 U.S. at 
793-94. 
39 Marsh, 463 U.S. at 794-95.  Another relevant factor in legislative prayer cases was the 
maturity of the audience.  See Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) 
(Brennan, J., concurring): 
The saying of invocational prayers in legislative chambers, state or 
federal, and the appointment of legislative chaplains, might well 
represent no involvements of the kind prohibited by the Establishment 
Clause.  Legislators, federal and state, are mature adults who may 
presumably absent themselves from such public and ceremonial 
exercises without incurring any penalty, direct or indirect. 
Id. at 299-300 (footnote omitted).  Justice Brennan, however, had a change of heart 
regarding legislative prayer twenty years later in Marsh.  See generally Marsh, 463 U.S. at 
795-96 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
40 Marsh, 463 U.S. at 795. 
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Members of the Court commented on the Marsh analysis and shed 
more light on the evaluation of particular prayers used in legislative 
settings in County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union.41  While 
Allegheny dealt with the holiday display of a crèche in a county 
courthouse, the display was analogized with the legislative prayer in 
Marsh.42  The majority noted that although the Founding Fathers 
authorized the use of legislative prayer at the time of the passage of the 
Bill of Rights, such history “cannot legitimate practices that demonstrate 
the government’s allegiance to a particular sect or creed.”43  This 
                                                 
41 E.g. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 662-63 (1989) (O’Connor, J., 
concurrence): 
[I]n Marsh v. Chambers, we found that Nebraska’s practice of 
employing a legislative chaplain did not violate the Establishment 
Clause, because legislative prayer presents no more potential for 
establishment than the provision of school transportation, beneficial 
grants for higher education, or tax exemptions for religious 
organizations.  Noncoercive government action within the realm of 
flexible accommodation or passive acknowledgment of existing 
symbols does not violate the Establishment Clause unless it benefits 
religion in a way more direct and more substantial than practices that 
are accepted in our national heritage. 
Id.  (citation omitted). 
42 Id.  See also Lynch v. Donnelly, 464 U.S. 668 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring): 
These features combine to make the government’s display of the 
crèche in this particular physical setting no more an endorsement of 
religion than such governmental “acknowledgments” of religion as 
legislative prayers of the type approved of in Marsh, government 
declaration of Thanksgiving as a public holiday, printing of “In God 
We Trust” on coins, and opening court sessions with “God save the 
United States and this honorable court.” Those government 
acknowledgments of religion serve, in the only ways reasonably 
possible in our culture, the legitimate secular purposes of solemnizing 
public occasions, expressing confidence in the future, and encouraging 
the recognition of what is worthy of appreciation in society. For that 
reason, and because of their history and ubiquity, those practices are 
not understood as conveying government approval of particular 
religious beliefs. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
43 Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 603.  The Court continues: 
Indeed, in Marsh itself, the Court recognized that not even the “unique 
history” of legislative prayer can justify contemporary legislative 
prayers that have the effect of affiliating the government with any one 
specific faith or belief.  The legislative prayers involved in Marsh did 
not violate this principle because the particular chaplain had “removed 
all references to Christ.”  Thus, Marsh plainly does not stand for the 
sweeping proposition . . . that all accepted practices 200 years old and 
their equivalents are constitutional today.  Nor can Marsh, given its 
facts and its reasoning, compel the conclusion that the display of the 
crèche involved in this lawsuit is constitutional . . . . 
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discussion from Allegheny is usually considered in addition to the 
holding from Marsh when courts evaluate the allowable content of 
particular prayer in challenges to legislative prayer.44  An appraisal of 
this fusion of Marsh and Allegheny, often followed by the lower courts, 
concludes that while the government cannot align itself with a particular 
faith, legislative bodies may provide an invocation before engaging in 
public business.45  This summation of Marsh and Allegheny decisions will 
be referred to throughout this Note as the Marsh/Allegheny doctrine.46 
B. The Ensuing Evaluation of Legislative Prayer 
The Supreme Court’s application of the Establishment Clause to 
government prayer activities has two main branches – legislative prayer 
and school prayer.47  While government prayer in public schools is 
uniformly banned in primary and secondary schools, once a student 
leaves his high school graduation ceremony, the only Establishment 
Clause protection offered by the Court to address adult exposure to 
government prayer is in the legislative prayer context.48  This Part 
                                                                                                             
. . . The history of this Nation, it is perhaps sad to say, contains 
numerous examples of official acts that endorsed Christianity 
specifically . . . .  Whatever else the Establishment Clause may mean . . . 
, it certainly means at the very least that government may not 
demonstrate a preference for one particular sect or creed (including a 
preference for Christianity over other religions). 
Id. at 603-05.  (Internal cites omitted). 
44 See, e.g., Hinrichs v. Bosma, 400 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1117 (S.D. Ind. 2005) (holding that 
the emphasis of Christian doctrine, including the resurrection and divinity of Jesus of 
Nazareth, overstepped the bounds of nonsectarian prayer allowed by Marsh). 
45 Wynne v. Town of Great Falls, 376 F.3d 292, 298 (4th Cir. 2004).  Specifically, this court 
noted that Marsh and Allegheny can be read together to: 
. . . teach that, in view of our Nation’s long and unique history, a 
legislative body generally may, without violating the Establishment 
Clause, invoke Divine guidance for itself before engaging in its public 
business.  But Marsh and Allegheny also teach that a legislative body 
cannot, consistent with the Establishment Clause, exploit this prayer 
opportunity to affiliate the Government with one specific faith or belief 
in preference to others. 
Id.  (internal quotes omitted). 
46 See infra Parts II.B, III. 
47 See generally CHEMERINSKY, supra note 22, at § 12.2. 
48 See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983); see also Elizabeth B. Halligan, Note, 
Coercing Adults?: The Fourth Circuit and the Acceptability of Religious Expression in Government 
Settings, 57 S.C. L. REV. 923, 925 (2005-2006) (recognizing that the Supreme Court has 
addressed various public school prayer cases but has only addressed adult prayer in the 
legislative prayer setting).  But see Mellen v. Bunting, 327 F.3d 355 (4th Cir. 2003) (holding 
that supper prayer at the Virginia Military Institute violated the Establishment Clause due 
to the coercive elements unique to the military college). 
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elucidates the application of the Supreme Court’s decisions regarding 
legislative prayer and other prayer in adult situations.49  
1. Marsh/Allegheny Applied:  Limits on Content 
Since Marsh and Allegheny, lower courts have attempted to define the 
constitutionality of legislative prayer content. 50  The Tenth Circuit, for 
example, examined a specific prayer to be given at the opening of a city 
council meeting in Snyder v. Murray City Corporation.51  Ignoring the 
                                                 
49 See infra Parts II.B.1, II.B.2. 
50 See infra Part II.B.  The Marsh decision was announced after the D.C. Circuit heard oral 
arguments in the case of Murray v. Buchanan, in which the payment of salaries and 
expenses for Chaplains of the U.S. House of Representatives and Senate were challenged, 
but was dismissed by the district court.  Murray v. Buchanan, 720 F.2d. 689, 690 (D.C. Cir. 
1983) (per curiam) (en banc).  The D.C. Circuit dismissed the appeal.  Id. 
51 Snyder v. Murray City Corp., 159 F.3d 1227 (10th Cir. 1998).  The plaintiff, unhappy 
with the resumption of legislative prayers in Utah, drafted the following prayer proposal to 
be given at a Murray City council meeting: 
 Our Mother, who art in heaven (if, indeed there is a heaven and if 
there is a god that takes a woman’s form) hallowed be thy name, we 
ask for thy blessing for and guidance of those that will participate in 
this meeting and for those mortals that govern the state of Utah; We 
fervently ask that you guide the leaders of this city, Salt Lake County 
and the state of Utah so that they may see the wisdom of separating 
church and state and so that they will never again perform demeaning 
religious ceremonies as part of official government functions; 
 We pray that you prevent self-righteous politicians from mis-
using the name of God in conducting government meetings; and, that 
you lead them away from the hypocritical and blasphemous deception 
of the public, attempting to make the people believe that bureaucrats’ 
decisions and actions have thy stamp of approval if prayers are offered 
at the beginning of government meetings; 
 We ask that you grant Utah’s leaders and politicians enough 
courage and discernment to understand that religion is a private 
matter between every individual and his or her deity; we beseech thee 
to educate government leaders that religious beliefs should not be 
broadcast and revealed for the purpose of impressing others; we pray 
that you strike down those that mis-use your name and those that 
cheapen the institution of prayer by using it for their own selfish 
political gains; 
 We ask that the people of the state of Utah will some day learn 
the wisdom of the separation of church and state; we ask that you will 
teach the people of Utah that government should not participate in 
religion; we pray that you smite those government officials that would 
attempt to censor or control prayers made by anyone to you or to any 
other of our gods; 
 We ask that you deliver us from the evil of forced religious 
worship now sought to be imposed upon the people of the state of 
Utah by the actions of mis-guided, weak and stupid politicians, who 
abuse power in their own self-righteousness; 
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motive of the prayer-giver, whose goal was to completely thwart all city 
government prayer, the court applied the Marsh/Allegheny analysis.52  As 
such, the prayer was rejected because the content of the prayer both 
proselytized for a specific brand of religion and disparaged other 
divergent religious views.53   
The Ninth Circuit succinctly held that allowing prayers “in the name 
of Jesus” at school board meetings violated the Establishment Clause, in 
Bacus v. Palo Verde Unified School District Board of Education.54  The 
references to Christ advanced a single faith.55  While not disparaging 
                                                                                                             
 All this we ask in thy name and in the name of thy son (if in fact 
you had a son that visited Earth) for the eternal betterment of all of us 
who populate the great state of Utah.  Amen. 
Id. at 1229 n.3.  The Tenth Circuit pondered whether this was religious speech or “political 
harangue[:]” 
Although Snyder’s putative prayer is unusual and iconoclastic, 
because this case was decided on summary judgment we will assume 
without deciding that it is an invocational prayer . . . .  [T]he 
Establishment Clause speaks only to the religious aspect of Snyder’s 
prayer, which we presume for purposes of this appeal, and as a result, 
we are not called in this case to evaluate the prayer’s political 
overtones.  By assuming the religious content of Snyder’s prayer, we 
expressly reserve for another day the very difficult issue of attempting 
to discern the line between prayer and secular speech masquerading as 
prayer. 
Id. at 1228-29. 
52 Id. at 1232-36.  The Tenth Circuit opinion discusses Marsh’s acceptance of prayers 
offered within a tolerable range of common beliefs and selection of the person reciting the 
prayer.  Id. at 1233-34.  Snyder’s prayer fails in both comparisons.  Id. at 1236. 
53 Id. at 1236.  The court stated that “Snyder’s claim must fail as a matter of law because 
his proposed prayer falls well outside the genre of legislative prayers that the Supreme 
Court approved in Marsh” and his prayer “aggressively proselytizes for his particular 
religious views and strongly disparages other religious views[,]”. . .  “clearly draws on the 
tenets of his belief . . . that prayer should only be conducted in private[,]”. . .  “seeks to 
convert his audience to his belief in the sacrilegious nature of governmental prayer[,]” all of 
which make the prayer proselytizing and outside the allowable boundaries of Marsh 
analysis.  Id. at 1235. 
54 52 F. App’x 355 (9th Cir. 2002).  The opinion is precise and concise in its rejection of 
the board meeting prayers and contains a memorandum deeming it inappropriate for 
publication or citing to by the courts of the circuit.  Id. at 356.  Despite this, the case has 
been cited to in subsequent legislative prayer decisions.  E.g., Hinrichs v. Bosma, 400 F. 
Supp. 2d 1103 (S.D. Ind. 2005); Pelphrey v. Cobb County, Ga., 410 F. Supp. 2d. 1324, 1335 
(2006). 
55 Bacus, 52 F. App’x at 356.  The court sidesteps the issue of whether the particular 
prayer in question here at a school board meeting is more like legislative prayer or prayers 
in school rooms.  Id.  However, the opinion states that if it were school prayer, then 
“plainly these regular prayers ‘in the Name of Jesus’ would be unconstitutional,” and 
proceeds to apply the Marsh analysis.  Id. at 356-57.  But see Coles v. Cleveland Bd. of  
Educ., 171 F.3d 369 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding that prayer at a school board meeting is 
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other faiths or proselytizing, the prayers “advanced one faith, 
Christianity, providing it with a special endorsed and privileged status 
in the school board.”56  
The Fourth Circuit recently addressed legislative prayer in Wynne v. 
Town of Great Falls, South Carolina.57  In Wynne, a regular attendee of the 
town council meetings objected to references to Jesus Christ and asked 
the council, on more than one occasion, to use an alternative prayer with 
limited references to “God.”58  By applying the Marsh/Allegheny analysis, 
                                                                                                             
analogous to the school prayer cases and following that line of precedent, as opposed to the 
Marsh analysis, because the school board meetings were “conducted on school property by 
school officials, and are attended by students who actively and regularly participate in the 
discussions of school-related matters . . . [T]he logic behind the school prayer line of cases is 
more applicable to the school board’s meetings than is the logic behind the legislative-
prayer exception in Marsh.”).  Id. at 381. 
56 Bacus, 52 F. App’x at 357.  The court continues to explain that because the plaintiffs 
here were seeking to participate in their political community, their standing to bring suit 
was satisfied.  Id.  The plaintiffs were teachers in the community who certainly had reason 
to attend the school board meetings.  Id. at 356.  Because the prayers were unconstitutional, 
the teachers demonstrated standing through their injury in fact, the affront at each meeting, 
which was traceable to the challenged conduct, the opening prayer.  Id. 
57 Wynne v. Town of Great Falls, South Carolina, 376 F.3d 292, 295 (4th Cir. 2004).  The 
Fourth Circuit also addressed legislative prayer in Simpson v. Chesterfield County Board of 
Supervisors.  404 F.3d 276, 279 (4th Cir. 2005).  Curiously, both of these Fourth Circuit cases 
were brought by Wiccans.  Wynne, 376 F.3d at 295; Simpson, 404 F.3d at 279.  Wicca is based 
on a pagan religion, but has evolved in the United States into what is best described as 
modern feminine witchcraft.  BELIEF BEYOND BOUNDARIES: WICCA, CELTIC SPIRITUALITY 
AND THE NEW AGE 44-45, 137 (Joanne Pearson ed., The Open University 2002).  Simpson 
challenged her exclusion from the list of religious leaders providing nonsectarian 
invocations prior to the public sessions of the county board of supervisors.  Simpson, 404 
F.3d at 279-80.  Here, the content of the prayer was not an issue per se, rather the selection 
process for the prayer-givers was challenged.  Id. at 284.  Therefore, further discussion of 
this case is not included in this note because the content issue is not implicated.  
Interestingly, Wicca is non-proselytizing, a tradition grown from the history of witch hunts, 
and thus, also involves a great deal of secrecy, intimacy, and a high level of trust among its 
members.  BELIEF BEYOND BOUNDARIES, supra, at 136.  While it may seem an anomaly to 
have two recent federal appellate level prayer cases brought by Wiccans, perhaps the 
Wiccan dissatisfaction with legislative prayer should be viewed as originating in a similar 
manner as other nontraditional minority religions in constitutional case history.  See, e.g., 
Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York, Inc. v. Village of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150 
(2002); Lovell v. City of Griffin, Georgia, 303 U.S. 444 (1938) (discussing freedom of 
expression suits brought by Jehovah’s Witnesses); U.S. v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) 
(discussing Free Exercise Clause suits brought Amish litigants); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 
U.S. 205 (1972) (same). 
58 Wynne, 376 F.3d at 295.  Not only did the mayor refuse to change the content of the 
opening prayer, but subsequently several Christian ministers drafted resolutions and 
petitions supporting the continuance of the prayer practice which referred to Wynne as a 
“professed ‘witch.’”  Id.  When Wynne declined to stand during the prayer, she was 
chastised and threatened.  Id.  When she attempted to avoid the controversy by arriving at 
the meeting after the prayer was invoked, she was denied the right to speak at the meeting 
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the court determined that the practice “clearly advance[d] one faith, 
Christianity, in preference to others.”59  The public officials were held 
free to continue the invocations prior to the town council meetings but 
not to advance a single religious view.60 
Likewise, in Rubin v. City of Burbank, a California appellate court 
followed this line of analysis in holding that a city council’s intermittent 
invocation of the name of Jesus Christ violated the Establishment 
Clause.61  The court interpreted Marsh/Allegheny “to mean that any 
legislative prayer that proselytizes or advances one religious belief or 
faith, or disparages any other, violates the Establishment Clause.”62   
Most courts adhere to the Marsh/Allegheny analysis when evaluating 
prayers in city and county government meetings across the United 
States.63  The decisions applying Marsh/Allegheny predictably held that 
legislative prayer across the board is constitutionally acceptable, while 
sectarian content, even just invoking Jesus Christ, is unconstitutional.  
Recently, however, some courts have chosen to ignore this distinction.64   
                                                                                                             
because the opportunity to sign up on the agenda was only offered before the prayer.  Id.  
Wiccan beliefs predate Christianity.  Robyn Monaghan, Wiccans Dispel Stereotypes, THE 
TIMES, Oct. 31, 2006, at A7.  The Wiccan philosophy has no concept of “ultimate evil” and 
does not include a belief in, and therefore couldn’t worship, Satan.  Id. at A1.  Wiccans also 
do not practice any form of animal sacrifice; they are, in fact, animal lovers, often 
vegetarians.  Id. 
59 Wynne, 376 F.3d at 301 (internal citations omitted).  The Town Council argued that it 
was not “advancing” Christianity in its single invocation at each meeting, in that it was not 
trying to convert any attendees of other faiths.  Id. at 300.  However, the court refused to 
give the same meaning to the words “proselytize” and “advance” from Marsh, and held 
that the prayers here “embody the precise kind of advancement of one particular religion 
that Marsh cautioned against.”  Id. at 302 (internal quotes omitted); cf. Snyder v. Murray 
City Corp., 159 F.3d 1227, 1234 n.10 (10th Cir. 1998) (en banc) (noting that “all prayers 
‘advance’ a particular faith or belief in one way or another” and, therefore, only the “more 
aggressive form of advancement, i.e., proselytization” may be prohibited).  The Wynne 
court rejects this interpretation of “proselytize or advance” from Marsh, because 
“nonsectarian prayers, by definition, do not advance a particular sect or faith.”  Wynne, 376 
F.3d at 301 n.6. 
60 Wynne, 376 F.3d at 302.  This phrasing mirrors the Lemon test language, whereby 
government’s “principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits 
religion.”  Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) (citing Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 
U.S. 236, 243 (1968)). 
61 Rubin v. City of Burbank, 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 873. 
62 Id. 
63 See Pelphrey v. Cobb County, 410 F. Supp. 2d 1324 (N.D. Ga. 2006); Rubin v. City of 
Burbank, 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 867 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003). 
64 See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Processes of Constitutional Change: 
From Partisan Entrenchment to the National Surveillance State, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 489, 515-16 
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In Pelphrey v. Cobb County, Georgia, a Federal District Court ruled that 
prayers at County Commission meetings which include explicit 
references to the Christian faith were not proselytization or favoritism.65  
While the actual prayer content involved in Pelphrey was  analogous to 
                                                                                                             
(2006).  Discussing the Rehnquist Court and its current ramifications, religion is 
highlighted as an element of the “deeper agenda of the Bush Administration[:]” 
. . . [W]e believe that the Bush Administration’s commitment to 
changing the constitutional boundaries between church and state is 
especially important.  Moreover, previous Republican appointments 
have already borne considerable fruit.  The changes in constitutional 
doctrines involving religion have come closer than any others in the 
last fifteen years to deserving the name “revolutionary.” 
There has been a distinct and genuine move from the Warren and early 
Burger Court’s general hostility to government support of religion to a 
new theory of “neutrality” . . . .  The Court now places relatively few 
barriers in the way of state or federal funds goint to religious schools 
or other religious organizations so long as the purpose is not a naked 
preference for religious versus secular organizations.  Some advocates 
believed – some with horror, some with joy – that this portended a full 
180 degree turn, in which the Supreme Court would define 
“neutrality” as requiring support for religious education so long as 
nonreligious education received support. . . . 
. . . [I]t is impossible to estimate the shelf life of the Court’s twin – and 
many would say incoherent – decisions in McCreary County v. ACLU 
and Van Orden v. Perry  regarding government-supported displays of 
religion in the public square.  In these two cases, the Court struck 
down a publicly supported display of the Ten Commandments in 
Kentucky, but upheld one in Texas.  Justice Kennedy was a dissent in 
McCreary County, and in the plurality in Van Orden.  Given that he is 
the new swing Justice, this means that Van Orden, which gave local 
governments far greater leeway to place religious iconography in 
public places, probably represents the wave of the future. 
Id. 
65 Pelphrey, 410 F. Supp. 2d at 1324.  The record from Pelphrey lacks specific details 
concerning who offers the prayers at the County Commission meetings and the exact 
content of the prayers, but the district court seemed unconcerned about such particulars 
because the prayers “typically last less than one minute.”  Id. at 1325.  The decision 
describes the complainants’ focus as follows: 
Plaintiffs, focusing on meetings that took place during an eighteen 
month period prior to commencement of this lawsuit, have identified 
thirty prayers including references to “Jesus,” “Christ,” or “Jesus 
Christ” given at County Commission meetings, and point to twelve 
such references during Planning Commission meetings.  Typically, 
these references were made at the conclusion of the prayer, and 
consisted of language such as, “in Christ’s name” or “in Jesus’ name 
we pray.” 
Id. at 1326.  The decision explains in a footnote that “assuming the eighteen month period 
selected by Plaintiffs presents a fairly representative sample, it would appear that a 
reference to Christ is made during approximately 75% of the invocations offered in the 
meetings of the County Commissions.”  Id. at 1326 n.3.  The decision also notes that not all 
of the references to Christ were “isolated or laconic.”  Id. at 1326 n.4. 
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the previous decisions disallowing overtly Christian content, the district 
court in Pelphrey departed from the holdings of the Fourth, Ninth, and 
Tenth Circuits.66  The lack of both “impermissible motive” to show a 
preference for Christianity and exploitation of the opportunity to 
proselytize convinced the court that no violation occurred.67  In this twist 
on the standard Marsh/Allegheny analysis, the court strictly followed the 
Marsh edict of declining to parse the prayers in its review and focused 
instead on the “cumulative effect of the legislative prayer practice, rather 
than on the speech constituting an individual prayer.”68  Noting the 
national rise of the Christian Conservative movement and the recent 
accommodation of religion in the context of government displays and 
school vouchers, Pelphrey introduces a similar policy shift in the 
allowable content of legislative prayer.69 
                                                 
66 Id. at 1338.  The court of the Northern District of Georgia specifically declines to follow 
the interpretation and application of Marsh from several of the cases examined above: 
After carefully considering the matter, the Court cannot accept the 
latter courts’ reading of Marsh and its progeny.  Such a per se 
proscription on any reference to a deity acknowledged by one faith, or 
any belief unique to that faith, would force courts into precisely the 
position the Supreme Court cautioned against in Marsh . . . requiring 
them to assume the role of regulators and censors of legislative prayer. 
Id. at 1339. 
67 Id. at 1348.  The district court asserts: 
[T]here is insufficient evidence before the Court to suggest an effort by 
the Cobb County Commissions to exploit the legislative prayer 
opportunity to proselytize or advance any one, or to disparage any 
other, faith or belief.  The prayers at issue did not invariably contain 
sectarian Christian references, and indeed, were on a number of 
occasions given by non-Christian . . . clergy . . . Further, while the 
percentage of prayers that included some reference to “Jesus” or 
“Christ,” in the subset selected by Plaintiffs, is indeed substantial, this 
Court is disinclined . . . to condemn a practice of legislative prayer 
based on numbers alone. 
Id. at 1346-47 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
68 Id. at 1338.  Cf. Wynne v. Town of Great Falls, South Carolina, 376 F.3d 292 (4th Cir. 
2004) (holding that plaintiff’s request to limit prayer references to “God” reasonable, and 
references to “Jesus Christ” advance a particular religion). 
69 See, e.g., NOAH FELDMAN, DIVIDED BY GOD 199-219 (Farrar, Straus and Giroux 2005).  
Since the Marsh decision, there has been a rising of values-based evangelicalism, beginning 
with the Christian Conservative movement which successfully pressed for the re-election 
of Ronald Reagan in 1984 to ensure control over the changing Supreme Court.  Id. at 199-
200.  At this time, recent legal history demonstrated protection of religious minorities, like 
Jews and Jehovah’s Witnesses, from the religious will of the majority.  Id. at 206.  In a 
tactical response, the Christian evangelicals began depicting themselves as the minorities, 
refused equal treatment and protection by their government.  Id.  Their strategy has been 
successful, especially in areas involving economics.  Id. at 216.  But the evangelicals have 
not yet been as successful in the courts, losing hard-fought clashes over public displays of 
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2. Adult Prayer in Non-Legislative Situations:  Alternatives to the 
Marsh/Allegheny Analysis 
Cases regarding adult-environment prayer are unique, but are 
consistently evaluated like the other branch of government prayer cases, 
those involving school prayer.70  The first adult prayer case, Tanford v. 
Brand,71 involved a challenge to the invocation and benediction practice 
during the Indiana University commencement ceremony.72  The 
plaintiffs argued that they felt coerced to attend the ceremony, during 
which the government sponsored prayer was thrust upon them against 
                                                                                                             
religion, creationism, and prayer in schools.  See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) 
(holding that a nondenominational prayer at a school graduation violates the Constitution); 
see also County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. 573 (1989) (holding that the display of a creche and 
menorah violates the Establishment Clause); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) 
(holding that the teaching of “creation science” is an unconstitutional attempt to teach 
religion in schools).  But see Van Orden, v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854 (2005) (holding that granite 
display of the Ten Commandments on the Texas Statehouse grounds is constitutional); 
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (holding that government provision of 
school tuition vouchers to be used at religious schools is constitutional). 
70 See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.  See generally Deanna N. Pihos, Assuming 
Maturity Matters: The Limited Reach of the Establishment Clause at Public Universities, 90 
CORNELL L. REV. 1349 (2005); Henry J. Reske, And May God Bless, 78 A.B.A. J. 46 (Feb. 1992) 
(discussing the subtle coercion of Lee v. Weisman).  In school prayer/adult prayer cases, the 
test in Lemon with coercion is most often applied.  The endorsement test requires that the 
government minimize the extent to which it encourages or discourages religious belief or 
disbelief, practice or non-practice, observance or nonobservance.  See Lynch v. Donnelly, 
464 U.S. 668, 694 (1984) (“Every Government practice must be judged in its unique 
circumstances to determine whether it constitutes an endorsement or disapproval of 
religion.”); Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward 
Religion, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 993, 1001 (1990).  The neutrality test dictates that the 
government acts with neutrality when, following neutral criteria and evenhanded policies, 
it “extends benefits to recipients whose ideologies and viewpoints, including religious 
ones, are broad and diverse.”  Rosenberger v. University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 839 
(1995).  See generally Patrick M. Garry, Religious Freedom Deserves More Than Neutrality: The 
Constitutional Argument for Nonpreferential Favoritism of Religion, 57 FLA. L. REV. 1 (2005) 
(discussing the Supreme Court’s acceptance of the neutrality doctrine, especially in grants 
of aid to education); Arnold H. Loewy, The Positive Reality and Normative Virtues of a 
“Neutral” Establishment Clause, 41 BRANDEIS L.J. 533 (2003) (discussing and encouraging 
neutrality jurisprudence).  But see E. Gregory Wallace, When Government Speaks Religiously, 
21 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1183, 1187-1202 (1994) (discussing the “myth” of neutrality in 
government speech).  Due to its particular applicability to funding programs, the neutrality 
test has not been applied to legislative prayer cases.  See Hinrichs, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 1115 
n.11.  While tax dollars are spent on legislative prayer in most state legislature cases, either 
on the chaplain’s salary or the process of inviting and thanking visiting prayer-givers, the 
test is not applicable in the way it was developed in Rosenberger.  Id. 
71 Tanford v. Brand, 104 F.3d 982 (7th Cir. 1997). 
72 Id.  A law professor, two law students, and an undergraduate student at Indiana 
University brought suit to enjoin the prayers.  Id.  Indiana University’s practice of having 
an invocation and benediction at its commencements was a 155 year tradition.  Id. at 986. 
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their will.73  The prayer offered at the ceremony was non-sectarian in 
nature, and accommodations were offered to make exit and re-entry “an 
easy matter” for those wishing to avoid the prayer entirely.74  While 
prayer at middle school and high school graduations is unconstitutional, 
the court determined that the students attending the University are 
older, less impressionable, and could avoid the prayer altogether if 
desired.75   
Chaudhuri v. State of Tennessee followed Tanford, expanding on its 
groundwork.76  Dr. Chaudhuri, a practicing Hindu, challenged the 
University’s use of prayer and moments of silence at a variety of school 
functions.77  The Sixth Circuit followed similar reasoning to the Tanford 
decision, holding that attendance at the University events where prayer 
was offered was not mandatory.78  While Chaudhuri argued that the 
“university service” component of his professional evaluations was 
affected by attendance and participation in University events, the court 
                                                 
73 Id. at 984-85. 
74 Id. at 983-84.  The prayer offered at the May 1995 benediction read as follows: 
Let us pray.  Gracious God we have gathered as dreamers.  People 
who believe deep inside that things can be better.  We have been called 
into being by you to make a difference.  We like giving.  Be with us as 
we endeavor to reach out to those who feel distance from the joy and 
the challenge of truth.  We pray that we might touch with our learning 
those who feel that there is no hope, no reason to believe in life and 
love, and the possibility itself.  Strengthen us for the journeys of mind, 
of heart, of spirit, of body, so that we might be right in truth for one 
another, and for our world.  We ask this in the name of our common 
god.  Amen. 
Id. at 983 n.1. 
75 Id. at 985-86.  The students could forego the ceremony altogether and receive their 
diplomas through alternate means or they were free to exit and re-enter the ceremony at 
will.  Id.  The law professor was under no obligation to attend the ceremony either and, like 
the students, was free to come and go at will.  Id. 
76 Chaudhuri v. State of Tennessee, 130 F.3d 232 (6th Cir. 1997). The plaintiff was a 
tenured professor at Tennessee State University who, over the years, lodged several 
complaints against the University challenging prayer practice.  Id. at 233-35.  Plaintiff’s 
complaints began as early as 1988, when his dissatisfaction with University prayer practice 
compelled the University to adopt the use of non-sectarian prayers.  Id. at 234.  Dr. 
Chaudhuri also filed suit for an alleged Civil Rights violation due to religious 
discrimination.  Id. at 234.  The district court granted the school summary judgment.  Id. at 
234 n.1. 
77 Id. at 233.  Chaudhuri was not satisfied by the adoption of non-sectarian prayer 
practice at the University because the prayers still strongly suggested a monotheistic 
religious view.  Id. at 236.  He was also dissatisfied with the use of moments of silence 
because he felt the intent was still to allow prayer.  Id. at 233. 
78 Id. at 238. 
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found that his maturity and his freedom to refrain from both the events 
and the prayers made him less vulnerable to religious indoctrination.79 
The Sixth Circuit addressed adult prayer again by examining the 
prayer practice at school board meetings in Coles v. Cleveland Board of 
Education.80  The challenged prayer was initially held to be a 
constitutionally permissible legislative prayer under Marsh due to the 
“adult atmosphere” and the fact that the school board was an elected 
body.81  However, the Sixth Circuit rejected both notions, deciding 
instead that the board meetings were an “integral part of the public 
school system” whose activities set it apart from the normal definition of 
legislative bodies exempted by Marsh.82  The school board’s prayers 
failed the Lemon test and were declared an unconstitutional government 
prayer practice that endorsed Christianity.83 
The final adult prayer case, in which the supper prayer practice at 
the Virginia Military Institute (VMI) was challenged, is Mellen v. 
Bunting.84  Like Tanford and Chaudhuri, Mellen involves prayer in a 
college atmosphere.85  Referring often to the holdings of Tanford and 
Chaudhuri, the court questioned the amount of coercion present in the 
                                                 
79 Id. at 239.  One judge dissented as to the content of the prayers, compelling the bench 
to be cautious and vigilant in protecting non-Christians from prayers offered often in our 
nation with a strong Christian tradition.  Id. at 240-41 (Jones, J., concurring and dissenting). 
80 Mellen v. Bunting, 171 F.3d 369 (6th Cir. 1999).  The prayers offered were clearly 
sectarian, with repeated references to Jesus and the Bible, usually delivered by the school 
board president, who was also a Christian minister.  Id. at 385. 
81 Coles v. Cleveland Board of Edu., 950 F. Supp. 1337, 1345-47 (N.D. Ohio 1996).  See 
generally Paul Ryneski, The Constitutionality of Praying at Government Events, 1996 DET. C.L. 
REV. 603 (1996) (discussing prayer at a variety of events, from school graduation 
ceremonies to city council meetings). 
82 Coles, 171 F.3d at 381.  The court notes that the “constituency” of the board includes 
students, who cannot vote, and therefore have no say in who represents them at the board 
meetings, and who, due to their age, are more likely to be influenced by the clearly 
sectarian prayers offered.  Id. 
83 Id. at 386.  Though the court refers to the possibility of coercion as in Lee, the Lemon 
test was applied and the prayer practice failed all three prongs.  Id. at 383-85.  Cf Bacus v. 
Palo Verde Unified School District Board of Education, 52 Fed.Appx. 355 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(applying Marsh/Allegheny to hold similar school board prayer practice unconstitutional 
due to its sectarian nature). 
84 327 F.3d 355 (4th Cir. 2003). 
85 Id. at 360.  VMI is a state-operated military college funded by the Commonwealth of 
Virginia which utilizes an adversarial method of training in its preparation of students for 
military service and leadership.  Id. at 361.  Two former cadets sued to enjoin VMI from the 
prayer practice and sought damages for the violation of the Establishment Clause.  Id. at 
360.  Though the district court issued declaratory and injunctive relief, that judgment was 
vacated because the cadets had already graduated from VMI.  Id. 
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university prayer situations.86  Unlike the practices at Indiana University 
and Tennessee State University, the VMI system of education was found 
to be “uniquely susceptible to coercion.”87  Many of the school’s training 
methods involved conformity and highly encouraged participation in 
mandatory and ritualized activities.88  Such pressure to attend state-
sponsored prayer events failed the Lemon test due to the coercive 
environment and therefore failed to satisfy the Establishment Clause 
prohibition.89 
C.   Two Cases Which Highlight the Limits of the Legislative Prayer Exception 
Recent political trends have brought religion and government prayer 
to the forefront of legal debate.90  Along with the recent Court’s 
                                                 
86 Id. at 371-72. 
87 Id. at 371.  The court explains: 
Although VMI’s cadets are not children, in VMI’s educational system 
they are uniquely susceptible to coercion.  VMI’s adversative method 
of education emphasizes the detailed regulation of conduct and the 
indoctrination of a strict moral code . . .  At VMI, even upperclassmen 
must submit to mandatory and ritualized activities, as obedience and 
conformity remain central tenets of the school’s educational 
philosophy. 
Id. 
88 Id. at 372.  Specifically referring to the dining service, the court explains: 
The technical “voluntariness” of the supper prayer does not save it 
from its constitutional infirmities.  At all relevant times, VMI’s 
upperclass cadets could avoid the mess hall in order to shield 
themselves from the prayer.  Nevertheless, the communal dining 
experience, like other official activities, is undoubtedly experienced as 
obligatory . . .  Put simply, VMI’s supper prayer exacts an 
unconstitutional toll on the consciences of religious objectors. 
Id. at 372. 
89 Id. at 376-77.  See generally Alexander A. Minard, But Could They Pray at UVA?  The 
Fourth Circuit’s Application of the Supreme Court’s School Prayer Jurisprudence to the Virginia 
Military Institute’s Adult Cadets, 13 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 997 (2005). 
90 E.g. Neela Banerjee, Proposal on Military Chaplains and Prayer Holds Up Bill, THE N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 19, 2006, at A19 (discussing the delay in passing a bill that sets the Pentagon’s 
spending levels due to a provision in the bill concerning the ability of military chaplains to 
deliver sectarian prayers at nondenominational military events): 
Chaplains can pray according to the traditions of their faith at worship 
services, where attendance is voluntary.  But they are also called upon 
to offer prayers at mandatory functions, like changes of command, 
banquets and speeches. 
 . . . 
Opponents of the provision . . . say that at mandatory events, the 
longstanding custom has been to offer a nonsectarian prayer, for 
example, citing  God, rather than Christ. 
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inclination to accommodate religion by allowing displays of religious 
symbols and permitting vouchers that support parochial school 
education, there has been a private push to expand Christian doctrine 
throughout American society.91  Hinrichs v. Bosma and Doe v. Tangipahoa 
Parish School Board, the two cases described in the Introduction, reflect 
this push.92 
1.   Hinrichs v. Bosma:93  Challenging the Content Allowed by 
Marsh/Allegheny 
Indiana House Rule 10.2 calls for a prayer or invocation prior to 
conducting business each meeting day.94  This practice is a long-standing 
tradition, occurring on each meeting day for the past 188 years.95  The 
                                                                                                             
The Defense Department, the main military chaplains association and 
a variety of ecumenical groups have spoken against the provision, 
saying that sectarian prayer would create division within the military. 
“This provision could marginalize chaplains who, in exercising their 
conscience, generate discomfort at mandatory formations,” the 
Pentagon said in a written statement.  “Such erosion of unit cohesion is 
avoided by the military’s present insistence on inclusive prayer at 
interfaith gatherings—something that the House legislation would 
operate against.” 
The provision is passionately supported, however, by many House 
Republicans and evangelical Christian groups, like Focus on the 
Family, who say that refusing chaplains, especially evangelicals, the 
chance to pray in Jesus’ name infringes on their religious liberty. 
Id.  Considering the deference given to the military in the past, it may be safe to assume 
that the Pentagon’s request to remain nonsectarian in the name of unity would be 
supported by courts.  See, e.g., Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986) (rejecting a free 
exercise challenge to the military denying an Orthodox Jewish doctor in the Air Force the 
right to wear a yarmulke on duty, in an effort to foster unity). 
91 See Zelman, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (holding that all school voucher programs will be 
sustained as long as they can show free choice of schools by parents); Bowen v. Kendrick, 
487 U.S. 589 (1988) (deeming constitutional the Adolescent Family Life Act, which provides 
for receipt of family counseling grants to religious, as well as nonreligious, organizations, 
but prohibits use of federal funds for family planning services, abortion counseling, or for 
abortions). 
92 See infra Parts II.C.1, II.C.2. 
93 400 F. Supp. 2d 1103 (S.D. Ind. 2005). 
94 Ind. H.R. R. 10.2 (simply listing “prayer” in the order of business of the House 
Conduct of Business Part of the Rules of the House of Representatives).  The order of 
business is as follows: Calling the House to order, Prayer, Pledge of Allegiance, Roll call, 
Reports from committees, Introduction of resolutions and bills, Business on the Speaker’s 
table, and Reading of the Journal.  Id. at 10. 
95 The Speaker argues that there exists a long standing history and tradition of not just 
legislative prayer, but Christian legislative prayer.  See Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 30, 
Hinrichs v. Bosma, Nos. 05-4604, 05-4781 (7th Cir. May 15, 2006) (“from America’s earliest 
days to the present time, the prayers delivered by congressional chaplains have been true 
sacral prayers, and many of them, true Christian prayers.”) (internal brackets omitted). 
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prayer is offered from the Speaker’s stand, which, by House Rules, no 
one may enter without the Speaker’s invitation.96  The invocation is 
given by a variety of people, including religious clerics the 
Representatives invite to be a “Minister of the Day” or by a 
Representative when no cleric is present.97 
Clerics are chosen through a nomination process by the 
Representatives which involves completion of a simple form specifying 
when the cleric is available, submission of the form to the Majority 
Caucus Chair who schedules the cleric, and sending a confirmation letter 
to the cleric.98  This letter includes a brief statement providing the cleric 
some guidance in prayer composition, which, if enforced, would satisfy 
the non-sectarian, non-proselytizing mandate of the Marsh/Allegheny 
decisions.99  The extent of guidance given to the visiting clerics is 
minimal, and no guidance at all is given to Representatives who provide 
invocations.100 
In 2005, the fifty-three opening prayers for the legislative session 
were called into question.101  The vast majority of prayers offered in that 
year were given by clerics identified with Christian churches.102  It is the 
content of the prayers, however, that gave rise to claims of 
                                                 
96 Ind. H.R. R. 15 (“No person shall enter upon the Speaker’s stand or stand upon the 
steps leading thereto without an invitation from the Speaker.”). 
97 Hinrichs, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 1105. 
98 Id.  No clergyman nominated through the “Minister for a Day” process has ever been 
turned down.  See Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 2, Hinrichs v. Bosma, Nos. 05-4604, 05-
4781 (7th Cir. May 15, 2006). 
99 Hinrichs, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 1105.  The letter states that “[t]he invocation is to be a short 
prayer asking for guidance and help in the matters that come before the members.  We ask 
that you strive for an ecumenical prayer as our members, staff and constituents come from 
different faith backgrounds.”  Id. 
100 Id. Following delivery of the invocation, no prayer-giver has ever been admonished, 
corrected, or advised in any way about the religious content of the prayer that he or she 
delivered.  Id. at 1108. 
101 Id. at 1108.  At the time of trial: 
Speaker Bosma was aware of the controversy and objections to the 
sectarian content of most of the prayers offered in 2005.  He planned to 
continue the practice of invocations being delivered at the start of each 
meeting day, and he did not expect to make any changes concerning 
how invocations are given, who gives the invocations, or the character 
of House oversight of the invocations’ content. 
Id. 
102 Id.  Forty-one prayers were delivered by clergy from Christian churches; nine were 
delivered by Representatives; one was delivered by a lay-person; one was delivered by a 
Muslim imam; one was delivered by a Jewish rabbi.  Id. 
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unconstitutionality.103  The majority of prayers were explicitly Christian, 
containing repeated reference to Jesus Christ, with some going so far as 
to ask for conversion to Christianity.104  The April 2005 performance by 
                                                 
103 Id. at 1125-26.  In contrast to the long-term chaplain of the Nebraska legislature in 
Marsh, the Indiana House methods of prayer-giver selection are similar to methods deemed 
acceptable in other post-Marsh cases, and the plaintiffs, in fact, find the methods 
satisfactory and “do not seek to have the prayers eliminated altogether.”  Id. at 1108.  
Hinrichs specifically objected to the sectarian content of the prayers.  Editorial, In Prayer, a 
House Open to All, FORT WAYNE JOURNAL-GAZETTE (Indiana), Dec. 4, 2005, at A11. 
[Hinrichs] said he had become troubled by tones reminiscent of 
Indiana’s Ku Klux Klan past. Unlike previous sessions, when non- 
sectarian prayers called on lawmakers to provide leadership, the 
prayers offered last spring suggested God was working through the 
legislators.  “When people think they are acting on behalf of Jesus 
Christ, that’s when it gets scary,” Hinrichs said. “The Klan was a 
Christian fraternal organization. The John Birch Society was a 
Christian organization. The fact is, they were based in faith.” 
Id. 
104 Hinrichs, 400 F. Supp. 2d. at 1106-08.  Of the fifty-three prayers given in the 2005 
session, transcripts were available for forty-five prayers; of these, twenty-nine were 
specifically offered with reference to Jesus Christ.  Id. at 1106.  Examples of the most 
explicitly Christian include: 
And for those who have lost family members in the current and 
persistent conflicts of the world, we ask that You would tenderly 
embrace them with the comfort of Your spirit, heal their pain in ways 
that only You can, by showing them the love You expressed in the 
sacrifice of Your Son Jesus Christ.  Now God, cause Your face to shine 
upon the men and women in this institution as they carry out Your call 
on their lives and fulfill Your will for this land.  While respecting those 
within the sound of my voice who may adhere to a different faith, I 
offer this prayer in the name of Jesus Christ, my Lord and Savior. 
Id. at 1106-07 (quoting ending of opening prayer offered on March 22, 2005).  Continuing: 
Today on behalf of every man and woman under the sound of my 
voice, every representative present in this house of government of the 
great state of Indiana, I appeal to the God and Father of Jesus Christ, 
the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, the God of the whole earth, that 
He would find not only a welcome here, among those whom He has 
honored to allow to sit in this place of authority, but also hearing ears 
and perceptive and courageous hearts that would walk in the ways of 
righteousness, govern in the way of justice, and make right choices. . . .  
Let it be known today that it is required in leaders that a man be found 
faithful.  That integrity is a requirement of a leader, and that every 
Representative is a leader before men and God. . . .  As a minister of 
the gospel, I exercise my right to declare this room a hallowed place.  I 
invite into this room, into the proceedings of the day, into the decisions 
that will [be] made today, to each person, the mighty Holy Spirit of 
God.  Holy Spirit, give these here the mind of Christ . . .  I ask this in 
the name of Jesus Christ. 
Id. at 1107-08 (quoting opening prayer from April 29, 2005).  Also: 
Lord we ask You that whatever we do, whatever we say, whatever we 
write, we do it in Your glorious name.  And now Lord we ask this in 
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Reverend Brown prompted some House members to walk out, believing 
that the sectarian nature of the song was inappropriate.105  Subsequently, 
four plaintiffs brought suit against the Speaker challenging the use of 
prayers that violate the mandate of Marsh.106 
The federal district court held that the prayers violated the 
Establishment Clause because of the emphasis on Christianity.107  The 
                                                                                                             
Your Son’s name, who is Lord of Lords, King of Kings, Jesus Christ, 
who gave us the most precious gift of all, to die on the cross for our 
sins.  Thank you Lord.  Bless us all.  We pray in Your name.  Amen. 
Id. at 1107 (citing 23 Jt. Ex. 16).  These prayers are examples of the sectarian, proselytizing 
prayers offered at the Indiana House of Representatives which clearly violate the spirit of 
Marsh.  Id. at 1107.  “Whatever you do in word or deed, do all in the name of the Lord 
Jesus, giving thanks through Him to God the Father.”  Id. at 1106. 
105 Hinrichs, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 1107.  Reverend Brown’s invocation delivered earlier 
included the following prayer: 
Father we are so gracious [sic] to You for Your grace and mercy that 
You have allowed us to be able to have and Father I thank You for our 
Lord and Savior Jesus Christ, who died that we might have the right to 
come together in love.  Father, let us love one another as he has loved 
us . . . I thank You in Jesus Christ’s name.  Amen. 
Id. 
106 Id. at 1108.  The four plaintiffs are all taxpayers who have standing as Indiana 
taxpayers who object to their taxes being used to support the current legislative prayer 
practices.  Id.  All four are members of Christian religions: Anthony Hinrichs is a member 
of the Society of Friends, Reverend Henry Gerner is a retired minister of the United 
Methodist Church, and Francis White Quigley and Lynette Herold are members of the 
Roman Catholic Church.  Id. at 1109.  Just how many Americans share the plaintiffs’ 
opinion is a mystery.  See Editorial, Prayer in the House, FORT WAYNE NEWS SENTINEL, Sept. 
8, 2006, at A8.  In reference to a recent poll conducted by the Pew Research Center for 
People & the Press and the Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life, the editorial presents the 
public opinion quandary: 
Nearly half of Americans (49 percent) believe conservative Christians 
have gone too far in trying to impose their religious values on the 
country, according to the survey.  At the same time, 69 percent think 
liberals have gone too far in trying to keep religion out of schools and 
government. 
Id.  Hinrichs has since lost his employment position due to his opposition to the legislative 
prayer practice.  Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee at 12, Hinrichs v. Bosma, Nos. 05-4604, 05-4781 
(7th Cir. May 15, 2006). 
107 Hinrichs, 400 F. Supp. 2d. at 1131.  In reaching this conclusion, the court also held that 
the plaintiffs, as taxpayers, had standing to sue and that the prayers in question were 
government speech.  Id. at 1114.  In subsequent briefs, Speaker Bosma has contested the 
plaintiffs’ taxpayer standing: 
Plaintiffs stipulated that when a member prays, the House incurs no 
expenses for the invocation other than the normal expenses associated 
with operating the House.  That stipulation is fatal to any assertion of a 
direct dollars-and-cents injury based on an appropriation or 
disbursement of public funds occasioned solely by the activities 
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court made a painstaking and thorough analysis using Marsh, while also 
explaining its decision to avoid the other Establishment Clause tests.108  
The Great Falls, Chesterfield County, Palo Verde, and Burbank opinions were 
                                                                                                             
complained of.  At a bare minimum, then, this Court must vacate the 
injunction insofar as it relates to House members . . . 
Even as to the ministers’ prayers, plaintiffs offer no convincing rebuttal 
to our arguments . . .  In contrast to Marsh, where the legislature had 
appropriated funds for the chaplain’s salary, the outlays here—which 
plaintiffs concede are a trifle—are for items that ordinarily are 
provided as constituent services. 
Reply Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 3-4, Hinrichs v. Bosma, Nos. 05-4604, 05-4781 (7th 
Cir. July 5, 2006) (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
 The Speaker also claims that plaintiffs lack standing for prudential reasons.  Id. at 6-10.  
In contesting that the prayers from the Speaker qualify as government speech, the Speaker 
argues: 
The issue, then, is whether the House controls the content of the 
prayers, and the record is crystal clear on that point.  As the district 
court found, no cleric or Representative has ever been admonished, 
corrected, or advised in any way about the religious content of the 
prayer that he or she delivered.  Indeed, the premise of plaintiffs’ case 
is that the Speaker exercises insufficient control over the prayers. 
Even the invocations of House members are not fairly attributable to 
the state.  Plaintiffs say that prayer is part of the official agenda of the 
House, but in fact House Rule 10.2 requires that the invocation be 
given before the opening of official business.  Moreover, the Supreme 
Court has recognized that public officials’ speech is the government’s 
only when they speak pursuant to their official duties.  Legislators 
frequently make personal comments on the House floor, and not every 
remark they make is pursuant to their official duties.  This is especially 
true of prayers, which are unrelated to legislation, require no quorum 
or vote, and are unlikely to reflect the views of all members. 
Id. at 13-14 (internal citations and quotations omitted) (emphasis in original). 
108 Hinrichs, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 1115-22.  The court stated its intent and belief in 
application of Marsh as the standard: 
In Marsh v. Chambers, the Supreme Court recognized a special 
exception to the usual Establishment Clause doctrines and permitted 
the practice of having a paid legislative chaplain offer invocations in a 
state legislature.  Marsh v. Chambers establishes the principles and 
boundaries that guide this court’s consideration of the Indiana House 
prayer practices. 
Id. at 1115 (internal citations omitted).  The court notes possible use of other tests: 
The practice of any form of legislative prayer would probably not 
survive scrutiny under the most common Establishment Clause tests, 
the Lemon test . . . , the endorsement test . . . , or the neutrality test.  The 
practice might survive the coercion test, though judges must keep in 
mind that it may be easy for members of a religious majority to 
overlook coercive effects of official practices that favor their own 
religious traditions. 
Id. at 1115 n.11. 
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cited as consistent expressions of the Marsh doctrine.109  In his defense, 
the Speaker argued that the history and tradition of expressly Christian 
legislative prayers buttressed his practice.110  In addition, he argued that 
all prayers are sectarian, encouraging an all-or-nothing approach to 
legislative prayer in the hopes that the long history of prayer would 
garner the blanket exception for even sectarian prayers.111  Finally, the 
Speaker argued that the method used to choose the prayer-givers leaves 
open the possibility for all religions to participate, and he would be 
loathe to infringe upon their right to free speech.112  The court rejected 
these arguments and issued a permanent injunction against the Speaker 
to bar him from permitting sectarian prayer during the official 
proceedings of the Indiana House of Representatives.113 
The Speaker moved to stay the injunction pending appeal, but the 
district court immediately denied the stay.114  The Seventh Circuit also 
denied the stay shortly thereafter, holding that the Speaker was unable 
to meet his burden to show a significant probability of success on the 
                                                 
109 Id. at 1121-22.  Pelphrey was decided over a month after the district court decided 
Hinrichs, thus there were no inconsistent opinions applying Marsh to legislative prayer 
regarding the prayer content at the time of this decision.  See generally Pelphrey, 410 F. Supp. 
2d 1324 (N.D. Ga. 2006). 
110 Hinrichs, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 1122.  See also Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 1, Hinrichs 
v. Bosma, Nos. 05-4604, 05-4781 (7th Cir. May 15, 2006) (“[T]he issue here is whether Marsh 
invalidates sectarian legislative prayers—in particular, those referring to Jesus Christ—
despite the uncontroverted historical evidence that American legislative prayers have 
always included such references, and despite the entanglements of religion and 
government that would result if civil courts were required to parse prayers to distinguish 
sectarian from nonsectarian invocations.”) (internal quotations omitted). 
111 Hinrichs, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 1123-25.  However, this argument has been raised 
previously and dismissed because the secular purposes served by legislative prayer can be 
fulfilled by other means.  See Marsh, 463 U.S. at 797-98 (Brennan, J., dissenting): 
That the ‘purpose’ of legislative prayer is pre-eminently religious 
rather than secular seems to me to be self-evident.  ‘To invoke Divine 
guidance on a public body entrusted with making the laws,’ is nothing 
but a religious act.  Moreover, whatever secular functions legislative 
prayer might play—formally opening the legislative session, getting 
the members of the body to quiet down, and imbuing them with a 
sense of seriousness and high purpose—could so plainly be performed 
in a purely nonreligious fashion that to claim a secular purpose for the 
prayer is an insult to the perfectly honorable individuals who 
instituted and continue the practice. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
112 Hinrichs, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 1128. 
113 Id. at 1131. 
114 Hinrichs v. Bosma, 410 F. Supp. 2d 745 (S.D. Ind. 2006). 
Abrell: Just a Little Talk with Jesus: Reaching the Limits of the Legisla
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2007
172 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42 
merits or irreparable harm absent a stay.115  While awaiting appeal, the 
case has drawn considerable notice, as revealed by the eleven amicus 
briefs filed.116  Oral arguments became a media event, and speculation 
abounded concerning the decision and any further appeal.117 
Meanwhile, legislators supporting the House’s prayer practice have 
reacted to the district court holding.118  In the Indiana House of 
Representatives, the members have overwhelmingly resolved to support 
the Speaker in his quest to broaden the Supreme Court’s parameters of 
prayer content.119  In Congress, a Representative from Indiana has 
                                                 
115 Hinrichs v. Bosma, 440 F.3d 393 (7th Cir. 2006).  Though the opinion was a stay 
motion opinion, it discussed the merits of the case in rather extensive detail and has been 
cited in subsequent opinions regarding the topic of legislative prayer.  E.g. Tangipahoa 
Parish II, 477 F.3d 188, 216 (5th Cir. 2006); Pelphrey, 410 F. Supp. 2d at 1366 (N.D. Ga. 2006). 
116 Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals Legal Brief System, http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/ 
briefs.htm (last visited Aug. 22, 2007).  Nine amicus briefs were filed in support of the 
Appellant, Speaker Bosma, by the following advocates: the Liberty Counsel, the 
Foundation for Moral Law, the Alliance Defense Fund, the Becket Fund, the Indiana Family 
Institute, Theologians and Scholars (a group of twenty-one interested parties), the United 
States Department of Justice, Advance America, and the National Legal Foundation.  Id.  
Two amicus briefs were filed in support of the Appellees by the Anti-Defamation League 
and the American Jewish Congress.  Id. 
117 See, e.g., Mike Smith, Court Hears Fight on House Prayer: Appeal Result Could Have 
Ripples, THE JOURNAL GAZETTE (Fort Wayne, Indiana), Sept. 8, 2006, at A1: 
Bosma said [Judge] Kane [sic] told attorneys Thursday that the case 
was ‘a surrogate for prayer in Congress’ and could apply to ‘every 
state, local or national level of government that has prayer today.’ . . . 
 . . . 
 . . .  
Bosma said he believes the case ultimately will be decided by the U.S. 
Supreme Court. 
Id. 
118 Id.  Further: 
The ruling also prompted U.S. Rep. Mike Sodrel, R-Ind., to file a bill 
that would bar federal judges from ruling on the content of prayer in 
state legislatures.  It is pending in a House committee, according to 
Sodrel’s office. 
A provision that would prohibit using federal funds to enforce 
Hamilton’s ruling was amended into an appropriations bill that passed 
the U.S. House and is now before the Senate. 
Gail Gibson, GOP Lawmakers Take Aim at U.S. Judiciary, BALTIMORE SUN (Maryland), July 23, 
2006, at A3.  Oral Arguments were heard on September 7, 2006.  Id. 
119 H.R. Res. 1, 114th Gen. Ass., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2006).  The first Indiana House 
Resolution of 2006 was a reaction to the district court holding in Hindrichs urging the 
Speaker to use his authority to exhaust all possible appeals of the district court’s order.  
Among the Resolution’s declarations are support for the continuing history and tradition of 
the invocation prayer, accompanied by the necessity of these prayers due to the demands 
upon the Representatives: 
Whereas, the members of the Indiana House of Representatives are 
subject to the unique pressures and duties of their office and of the 
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introduced measures in support of the Christian references by seeking to 
cut off the jurisdiction of federal courts to hear the matter.120  The same 
                                                                                                             
burdens of the legislative environment, which frequently requires that 
they be absent from their own homes, families, and religious 
congregations; 
Whereas, the ministry of visiting clerics and the offering of invocations 
accommodates the spiritual needs of the members of the Indiana 
House of Representatives and facilitates the voluntary exercise of their 
faith, providing them with spiritual encouragement while they are 
away from their homes, families, and religious congregations; 
Id.  In addition, the Resolution admonishes the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of Indiana for its “restraint”  on the “religious liberty and the freedom of 
conscience and, . . . purports to control the specific content of prayers” in the “intolerable 
order” forbidding the use of Christ’s name or communicates “the beliefs that Jesus of 
Nazareth was the Christ, the Messiah, the Son of God, or the Savior, or that he was 
resurrected, or that he will return on Judgment Day or is otherwise divine.”  Id. 
 Confusingly, this plea for freedom of religious expression is followed by two 
assertions that to eliminate these Christian references would be “inconsistent with the 
settled beliefs and deepest convictions of many Hoosiers” and would, “because it attempts 
to control the content of prayer . . . undermine[ ] the rights of all Hoosiers regardless of 
their theological convictions.”  Id. 
 Finally, the Resolution addresses the Supreme Court’s decision in Marsh, focusing 
specifically on the opinion’s allowance of legislative prayer because of its historical practice 
and explaining the legislature’s difficulty in accepting or applying the court order: 
Whereas, as the United States Supreme Court’s decisions make clear, 
public officials are not competent, in our constitutional order, to make 
the fine theological distinctions and comparisons necessary for 
one to declare that a prayer is sufficiently “inclusive” or 
“nonsectarian” to satisfy the court’s injunction and the content of 
prayer is a matter solely for the religious conscience of the cleric or 
representative offering it. 
Id.  This is a puzzling assertion, since the Court’s holding in Marsh approved of the 
methods used in the Nebraska Legislature and the parameters of prayer content therein.  
Marsh, 463 U.S. at 795. 
 The Resolution passed by a vote of eighty-five to zero, with fifteen members either 
excused or abstaining.  See H.R. 1, supra. 
120 H.R. 4776, 109th Cong. (2006).  The bill introduced in the U.S. House of 
Representatives by U.S. Rep. Sodrel, R-Ind., seeks to strip federal jurisdiction in cases such 
as Hinrichs and is currently referred to the House Judiciary Committee.  Id.  The bill 
provides for an amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 1632 limiting jurisdiction as follows: 
No court created by Act of Congress shall have any jurisdiction, and 
the Supreme Court shall have no appellate jurisdiction, to hear or 
decide any question pertaining to the interpretation or the validity, 
under the Constitution, of the content of speech of any member of a 
State legislative body or any individual invited by a State legislative 
body to speak before that body, when such speech occurs during the 
legislative session of that body. 
H.R. 4776, 109th Cong. § 1 (2006).  Such jurisdiction stripping legislative mechanisms have 
been used in the past as a way to protest court rulings without success and this attempt 
will likely face immediate challenge.  See Gail Gibson, GOP Lawmakers Take Aim at U.S. 
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Congressman also successfully introduced an amendment to an 
appropriations bill in an effort to stop the allocation of any federal funds 
in the enforcement of the final judgment of this case.121  With the Seventh 
Circuit opinion pending, the Hinrichs case presents an opportunity for 
the Supreme Court to readdress and clarify the allowable content of state 
legislative prayer.122 
2. Doe v. Tangipahoa Parish School Board:  Extension of Marsh to the 
Local Level 
The Tangipahoa Parish case involving prayer at a School Board 
meeting was recently decided by the Fifth Circuit.123  While the lawsuit 
originally challenged prayer at school athletic events and prayers by 
students over school public-address systems, as well as those at the 
                                                                                                             
Judiciary, BALTIMORE SUN (Maryland), July 23, 2006, at A3.  Duke University law professor 
Erwin Chemerinsky, a constitutional law expert, noted that: 
This has been proposed in Congress over and over again through 
American history . . . In the 1950s, it was proposed with regard to the 
loyalty oath cases.  In the 1960s, it was the reapportionment cases, and 
then the school prayer cases.  In the 1980s, it was not letting federal 
courts hear abortion cases or [school] busing cases. . . .  I think that if 
the effect is to preclude all federal jurisdiction over a specific issue, 
that’s unconstitutional, and I think courts will say so.  If Congress can 
do this, then why couldn’t they pass a statute – imagine the most 
blatantly unconstitutional law, persecuting a particular religious group 
or racial minority – and then say, ‘No federal court, including the 
Supreme Court, can review this.’  That can’t be right. 
Id. 
121 H. Amdt. 1164 (A068), 109th Cong. (2006) (amending H.R. 5672).  The sole purpose of 
this amendment to an appropriations bill for Science, the Department of State, Justice, and 
Commerce, and related agencies, is the prohibition of using the funds “for the purpose of 
enforcing the final judgment of the Federal District Court for the Southern District of 
Indiana issued in Hinrichs v. Bosma.”  Id. 
122 See Balkin & Levinson, supra note 64, at 516.  On the Bush Administration’s agenda, 
the authors suggest: 
One can . . . imagine a wide range of different possible directions for 
Establishment Clause and Free Exercise doctrine, depending on 
remaining opportunities for President Bush to make appointments 
before his term expires in January 2009, the results of the 2006 elections 
(which might shift control of the Senate or weaken the Republican 
majority there), and, perhaps most importantly, the winner of the 2008 
presidential election.  It is worth noting, however, that a Democratic 
appointment replacing Justice Stevens in 2009 would likely preserve 
the current status quo that features Kennedy as the swing Justice, 
while replacing Stevens with a strong conservative would have a much 
more significant impact on the jurisprudence of the religion clauses 
. . . . 
Id. 
123 Tangipahoa Parish II, 477 F.3d 188 (5th Cir. 2006). 
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School Board meetings, the sole issue on appeal was the Board’s practice 
of opening invocations.124  In October of 2003, John Doe, an anonymous 
resident and taxpayer of Tangipahoa Parish and the father of two sons 
who attended high school in the Parish School System, filed an action for 
himself and his sons seeking to declare the School Board’s prayer 
practice an Establishment Clause violation and enjoin the School Board 
from continuing its practice.125   
Ten months later and, obviously, with full knowledge of the Does’ 
objections to the prayers, the Board considered the adoption of a policy 
which would limit the prayer-giving responsibilities to board members 
and require the invocations to be non-sectarian and non-proselytizing.126  
This policy, however, was unanimously rejected by the School Board.127  
The prayers are considered a local tradition, though their thirty-year 
history hardly compares to the 188-year-old tradition of the Indiana 
House of Representatives.128  Each meeting began with a prayer, 
                                                 
124 Id. at 192.  All other prayer practices were resolved by an August 2004 judgment 
which enjoined the other prayer events, except for prayers given by students at graduation 
ceremonies.  Id.  Two contempt motions were dismissed relating to incidents where a 
teacher’s aide and a substitute announcer at a baseball game violated the orders prohibiting 
the various other prayer practices.  Doe v. Tangipahoa Parish Sch. Bd. (Tangipahoa Parish 
III), 2005 WL 901127 at *1 (E.D. La. 2005).  The prayers often contained specific references to 
“God[,]” “Heavenly Father[,]” and “Jesus[.]”  Id.  The parties stipulated to the content of 
four specific prayers which had been delivered at School Board meetings between February 
2003 and June 2004.  Id. 
125 Tangipahoa Parish I, 2005 WL 517341 at *1.  The ACLU has commended the courage of 
the plaintiffs in Tangipahoa Parish for coming forward, albeit anonymously, to challenge 
the School Board’s repeated attempts to promote Christianity in the public schools.  Debra 
Lemoine, Judge Gets Arguments on School Board Meeting Prayers, BATON ROUGE ADVOC., 
Sept. 10, 2004, at 1. 
126 Tangipahoa Parish II, 477 F.3d at 194.  The policy had been prepared and recommended 
to the School Board by the New Orleans law firm hired by the school’s insurance company.  
Alan Sayre, Tangipahoa Schools to Drop Prayers Before Ballgames, BATON ROUGE ADVOC., Aug. 
25, 2004, at 5. 
127 Tangipahoa Parish II, 477 F.3d at 194.  The powerful influence of conservative 
Christians in the locality has rallied to support religious activities in the public schools.  See 
Debra Lemoine, Judge Gets Arguments on School Board Meeting Prayers, BATON ROUGE 
ADVOC., at 1 (quoting the athiest plaintiff in the evolution disclaimer lawsuit, “[t]hey want 
to involve the church in the school . . . If they hadn’t done it on a systematic basis, people 
like me wouldn’t have said anything.”). 
128 Compare Mellen, 327 F.3d 355, 370 (4th Cir. 2003) (declining to hold that the supper 
prayer at Virginia Military Institute shares the “unique history” of state legislative prayer 
because “public universities and military colleges, such as VMI, did not exist when the Bill 
of Rights was adopted”), with Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 667  (Breyer, J., concurring) 
(determining that the passage of forty years without any legal objection raised and as part 
of a broader moral and historical display strongly suggest that the granite Ten 
Commandments on the Statehouse grounds did not violate the Establishment Clause by 
promoting religion). 
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followed by recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance.129  The prayers were 
offered by a variety of speakers, ranging from board members and 
superintendents, as well as teachers, students, and ministers.130  
Questions of constitutionality were raised concerning both the prayer 
content and the classification of the board meetings as a legislative 
body.131 
Four particular prayers offered between January 2002 and August 
2004 were singled out in the case’s stipulations and called into 
question.132  All four prayers were overtly Christian.133  The three-judge 
                                                 
129 Tangipahoa Parish II, 477 F.3d at 192.  The School Board meetings are open to the public 
and students are welcome to attend.  Id.  In fact, of the sampling of thirty-one prayers 
delivered between January 2002 and August 2004, nine were given by students or former 
students.  Id. 
130 Id.  The four prayers singled out were delivered by the School System’s assistant 
superintendent, a Board member’s son, an elementary school principal, and a Board 
member, respectively.  Id. 
131 See generally Tangipahoa Parish II, 477 F.3d 188.  The first prayer from the parties’ 
stipulations contained the following: 
Heavenly Father, we thank you for the many blessings we’ve 
received. . . .  [W]e thank you for the greatest gift of all – your darling 
son, Jesus Christ.  For we all know that He was born, died, and rose 
again, so that we all may be forgiven for our sins. . . .  These things we 
ask in your darling son, Jesus Christ’s[,] name.  Amen. 
Id. at 192. 
132 Id. at 192-93.  The second prayer stipulated ended with the closing, “Grant our 
supplications, we beseech Thee, through Jesus Christ our Lord.  Amen.”  Id. at 193.  The 
third stipulated prayer opened with, “Heavenly Father, we thank you for all the blessings 
that you have given us,” and closed with, “we ask all of these things through Your Son, 
Jesus Christ.  Amen.”  Id.  The final stipulated prayer simply began with reference to 
“Father.”  Id. 
133 Id. at 192-93.  The prayers’ references to “Jesus Christ” and God as “Heavenly Father” 
are all that is necessary to make the prayers nonsectarian.  See G. Sidney Buchanan, Prayer 
in Governmental Institutions: The Who, the What, and the At Which Level, 74 TEMP. L. REV. 299, 
351 (2001) (suggesting as a bright-line rule that “References to ‘God,’ ‘Heavenly Father (or 
Mother),’ ‘Divine Being,’ ‘Ruler of the Universe,’ etc. are okay, but references to Jesus 
Christ, Muhammad, Buddha, etc. are not okay.”).  The School Board’s refusal to adopt the 
Marsh-appropriate policy limiting the content of the prayers to non-sectarian, non-
proselytizing language was irrelevant when the case was decided by the District Court 
because the lower court did not find the School Board to be a legislative body, and thus 
applied the Lemon test to hold that the practice at its core violated the Establishment 
Clause.  Tangipahoa Parish I, 2005 WL 517341 at *9.   The district court followed Coles v. 
Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 171 F.3d 369 (6th Cir. 1999), in its determination of a school board as 
an integral part of a public school system, thus evaluating the prayer practice as those in 
school environments.  Tangipahoa Parish I, 2005 WL 517341 at *6.  The district court also 
noted that other cases outside the public school setting have been unwilling to extend 
Marsh beyond its unique legislative setting.  Id. at *9 (citing North Carolina Civil Liberties 
Union Legal Found. v. Constangy, 947 F.2d 1145, 1147 (4th Cir. 1991) (holding that judicial 
prayer at the beginning of court sessions did not fall within the Marsh exception)). 
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panel of the Circuit Court gave three inconsistent opinions regarding 
both the appropriateness of the prayer content, and notably, the 
designation of the School Board meeting as a legislative or deliberative 
body.134  
The three judges adopted three different analyses.  One followed the 
Marsh/Allegheny doctrine, and after assuming that the School Board was 
a deliberative legislative body which fell under the legislative prayer 
exception, held that the four prayers in question were decidedly 
Christian in content and were impermissible.135  The second opinion 
followed the district court’s reasoning, refusing to classify the School 
Board as a legislative body and, applying Lemon, ruled that the prayer 
practice violated the Establishment Clause.136  The third opinion 
                                                 
134 See generally Tangipahoa Parish II, 477 F.3d 188. 
135 Id. at 202.  The reasoning is as follows: 
For the Board’s prayers to fall outside those permitted by Marsh, we 
must conclude either: (1) the Board, although stipulated to be a 
deliberative body, does not fit within Marsh’s description of legislative 
and other deliberative public bodies either because Marsh did not 
intend to encompass any entities beyond legislatures or because the 
prayers fit within the public-school context to which Marsh does not 
apply; or (2) the prayers are not nonsectarian and non-proselytizing, in 
violation of Marsh and subsequent guidance from the Court.  Because 
the overtly sectarian prayers included in the stipulations fall outside 
Marsh’s limited reach, we need not decide: (1) whether the Board fits 
within Marsh’s legislative scope; and (2) thus whether other prayers 
might be constitutionally permissible.  This is in keeping with the long-
standing and extremely sensible rule that constitutional issues should 
be decided on the most narrow, limited basis. 
Id.  (internal quotes and citations omitted). 
136 Id. at 212.  Adult environment prayer cases have explored both government 
endorsement of prayer through the Lemon test as well as subtle coercion.  Compare Coles, 
171 F.3d at 385-86 (concluding through use of the Lemon test that school board’s prayer 
practice conveys a message of government endorsement of religion in the public school 
system), with Tanford v. Brand, 104 F.3d 982, 986 (7th Cir. 1997) (applying the Lemon test to 
university commencement prayer and holding that such non-denominational invocation 
does not convey a message of government endorsement of religion).  Compare Mellen, 327 
F.3d at 370-71 (applying the Lemon test to supper prayer practice at the Virginia Military 
Institute, with special consideration given to coercive principles to hold prayers violated 
Establishment Clause), with Chaudhuri v. State of Tennessee, 130 F.3d 232, 238-39  (6th Cir. 
1997) (holding that a professor at a state university was not obligated to attend university 
events where non-sectarian prayers were delivered, thus Lee’s subtle coercion did not 
apply), and Tanford, 104 F.3d at 985-96 (declining to find coercion in the adult university 
commencement environment where students and professors are free to ignore prayers). 
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accepted the School board as a deliberative body worthy of the Marsh 
exception, and declined to find the Christian content objectionable.137   
Like the Hinrichs case, the Tangipahoa Parish case has sparked a slew 
of controversy in its locality.138  Taxpayers in Tangipahoa Parish accrued 
litigation costs of over $100,000 in seeking the Fifth Circuit appeal.139  
With the litigation spanning over three years, and the possibility of a 
further appeal by the School Board, the discord in Tangipahoa Parish 
continues.140  Additionally, like in Indiana, local politicians have latched 
onto this issue in state and national politics in an attempt to support the 
                                                 
137 Compare Tangipahoa Parish II, 477 F.3d at 211-17 (Clement, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (holding that Marsh applies to the School Board as a deliberative body, 
but that even if the prayers at the meetings were uniformly Christian, the record lacks 
“evidence that the Board advances Christianity to the exclusion of another sect or creed”), 
with Pelphrey, 410 F. Supp. 2d at 1348 (holding that the Cobb County Commission did not 
show an “impermissible governmental preference for one religious perspective.”). 
138 See Jenny Hurwitz, Student-Teacher Settles Lawsuit Against SLU: She was Flunked After 
Objecting to Prayers, NEW ORLEANS TIMES PICAYUNE, Oct. 5, 2006, at 1: 
A student-teacher who claimed she was given a failing grade by 
Southeastern Louisiana University because she objected to teacher-led 
prayer in a Ponchatoula classroom has settled a lawsuit she filed 
against the university. 
 . . . . 
In early 2005, Thompson was assigned to the public D.C. Reeves 
Elementary School in Ponchatoula as part of her student-teacher 
training.  Over the next few months, she observed teacher Pamela 
Sullivan lead her class in prayer and organize a Bible study group on 
school grounds on several occasions. 
The Tangipahoa Parish School Board, which also served as defendant 
in the case, later investigated Sullivan, verified the allegations, and 
ultimately halted such practices . . . 
An honor student who made the dean’s list at Southeastern, 
Thompson alleged the university gave her a failing grade because she 
reported the prayer activities. 
Id. 
139 David J. Mitchell, School Board Spent $100,900 on Prayer Fight, BATON ROUGE ADVOC., 
Nov. 12, 2006, at B3.  Of that amount, almost $85,000 will not be reimbursed by the School 
Board’s insurer and will be out of pocket expenses.  Id. 
140 David J. Mitchell, Understanding Key to Debate on Board Prayer, BATON ROUGE ADVOC., 
Jan. 9, 2007, at B7 (“The board is expected to consider whether to seek a rehearing by the 
entire appeals court – having until Jan. 19 to file – but one wonders whether more litigation 
by either side would produce a much different result.”); see also Appeals Court Finds 
Louisiana School Board Improperly Engaged in Sectarian Prayer During Meetings, U.S. FED. 
NEWS, Dec. 16, 2006 (quoting Joe Cook, Executive Director of the ACLU of Louisiana, 
“Because the court did not rule on the issue most central to the case, the ACLU and its 
clients are considering whether to request rehearing or appeal. . . .  We believe the court 
needs to squarely face the questions presented and make a clear cut decision.”). 
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validity of the Christian agenda.141  These measures concerning 
legislative prayer are just part of a larger national agenda addressing 
other Establishment Clause issues.142 
These two cases, Hinrichs and Tangipahoa Parish, exemplify the 
problems arising in legislative prayer doctrine.143  Speaker Bosma is 
attempting to expand the Marsh ruling to allow the use of blatantly 
Christian, arguably proselytizing prayer content.144  The Fifth Circuit’s 
three-judge panel failed to agree on whether the School Board is a 
legislative body under Marsh and the sectarian nature of the prayers.145  
With the Marsh decision leaving uncertainties as to the limits of prayer 
content allowed and the deliberative bodies to which it applies, courts 
are struggling to decide the cases before them that argue for the 
                                                 
141 See Briefing Book: News and Views from the Louisiana Capitol, NEW ORLEANS TIMES 
PICAYUNE, June 17, 2005 at 4: 
Siding with the Tangipahoa Parish School Board in a fight with the 
American Civil Liberties Union, a Senate panel approved a resolution 
Thursday that would express the support of the Legislature for prayer 
at school board meetings.  House Concurrent Resolution 39 by Rep. 
A.G. Crowe, R-Slidell, says prayer is protected and follows the 
principles on which the United States was founded.  It says the 
Legislature disapproves of a federal judge’s decision that prayers are 
unconstitutional at school board meetings.  The Senate Education 
Committee approved the resolution without objection or much 
discussion.  Already approved by the House, it goes next to the full 
Senate for debate.  If approved there, it would express the will of the 
Legislature.  It does not go to the governor’s desk for action. 
Id. 
142 In announcing the American Values Agenda legislative package, Speaker of the 
House J. Dennis Hastert (R-IL) issued the following statement: 
The American Values Agenda will defend America’s founding 
principles.  Through this agenda, we will work to protect the faith of 
our people, the sanctity of life and freedoms outlined by our founding 
fathers.  Radical courts have attempted to gut our religious freedom 
and redefine the value system on which America was built.  We hope 
to restore some of those basic values through passing this legislative 
agenda and renewing our country’s commitment to faith, freedom and 
life. 
Media Release from J. Dennis Hastert, Speaker of the House, http://speaker.house.gov/ 
library/misc/060627americanvalues.shtml.  Included in the legislative agenda are 
proposed acts “protecting” the Pledge of Allegiance, the display of the American flag, 
public prayer, heterosexual marriage, unborn children, embryos (e.g. stem cells), and gun 
ownership rights.  Id. 
143 See supra Part II.C (describing events surrounding the two highlighted cases). 
144 See supra Part II.C.1 (discussing the appeal of the challenge to prayers offered in the 
Indiana Legislature). 
145 See supra Part II.C.2 (discussing the lack of agreement in the decision from the Fifth 
Circuit Court of Appeals.) 
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application of the legislative prayer exception and legislative entities are 
wasting time and money arguing what could be a settled issue.146 
III.  TESTING THE LIMITS OF MARSH  
The Establishment Clause generally limits the interaction between 
government and religion.147  In the context of legislative prayer, 
governmental deliberative bodies lack guidelines as to what prayers can 
be offered and where.148  Recent cases are testing the constitutional limits 
of legislative prayer content and deliberative bodies to which the 
legislative prayer exception may be applied.149  The behavior in the 
Indiana House of Representatives, including the refusal to continue the 
prayer practice rather than follow the guidelines of the court injunction, 
may signal a shift in the political atmosphere concerning legislative 
prayer.150  Likewise, the refusal of the Tangipahoa Parish School Board to 
adopt the most commonly accepted interpretation of Marsh in its prayer 
practice indicates the School Board’s belief that it fits within the 
legislative prayer exception and can invoke sectarian prayers to open its 
meetings.151  In the first instance, prayer-givers are challenging the 
allowable content or language used in legislative prayers.152  In the 
second, governmental entities are expanding the breadth of deliberative 
bodies to which the Marsh exception applies.153  Ambiguities exist 
concerning both of these limiting factors, and these areas of uncertainty 
are allowing those with a religious agenda to blur the limits on prayer 
content and applicable deliberative bodies.154 
                                                 
146 See infra Part III (analyzing the Establishment Clause doctrines available and their 
application to legislative prayer). 
147 See supra Part II.A (discussing the history of legislative prayer, including its use by the 
First Congress). 
148 See supra Part II.B (discussing the application of Marsh/Allegheny to legislative prayer 
and the application of other Establishment Clause judicial doctrines in non-legislative, 
adult prayer situations). 
149 See supra Part II.C (discussing the two current cases which highlight the content and 
deliberative body parameters which this Note suggests require clarification). 
150 See supra Part II.C.1 (discussing the controversy surrounding the prayers in the 
Indiana Legislature). 
151 See supra Part II.C.2 (discussing the controversy surrounding the prayers offered at the 
Tangipahoa Parish School Board meetings). 
152 See supra Part II.C.1 (discussing Hinrichs). 
153 See supra Part II.C.2 (discussing Tangipahoa Parish). 
154 See infra Parts III.A, III.B (analyzing the limits of the Marsh/Allegheny doctrine). 
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A. The Marsh/Allegheny Doctrine Does Not Permit Sectarian Prayer 
Content 
Because Marsh is the only Supreme Court decision addressing 
legislative prayer, a clarification of the Court’s specific holdings is 
necessary.155  First, based on the nation’s history and tradition, which 
allow for legislative prayer, the Marsh opinion identifies the dominance 
of the Judeo-Christian tradition.156  This tradition, as offered by the 
chaplain from Nebraska who demonstrated sensitivity toward offending 
any religious minorities, was acceptable.157  In addition, both paying the 
chaplain and allowing a chaplain long-term tenure are within 
constitutional limits.158  The Court approved of the sixteen year term of 
the Nebraska clergyman because his reappointment was not found to 
come from any “impermissible motive.”159  Another important 
conclusion of Marsh, the constitutionality of legislative prayer itself, is 
straightforward and clear.160  The Marsh majority reached this conclusion 
                                                 
155 See supra Part II (discussing the history of legislative prayer and its development in 
case law since Marsh). 
156 See supra text accompanying note 39.  But see Steven G. Gey, More or Less Bunk: The 
Establishment Clause Answers that History Doesn’t Provide, 2004 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1617, 1631 
(2004) (rejecting the idea that the United States is a Protestant nation, a Christian nation, or 
even a uniformly religious nation). 
157 Marsh, 463 U.S. at 793-94.  Note again, however, that the opinion deliberately avoided 
dissecting the prayers’ content where there is not discernible motive shown for the practice 
to attempt to proselytize.  Id. at 794. 
158 See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text. 
159 See Marsh 463 U.S. at 793-94.  But see Marsh, 483 U.S. at 822-23 (Stevens, J., dissenting): 
In a democratically elected legislature, the religious beliefs of the 
chaplain tend to reflect the faith of the majority of the lawmakers’ 
constituents. Prayers may be said by a Catholic priest in the 
Massachusetts Legislature and by a Presbyterian minister in the 
Nebraska Legislature, but I would not expect to find a Jehovah’s 
Witness or a disciple of Mary Baker Eddy or the Reverend Moon 
serving as the official chaplain in any state legislature. Regardless of 
the motivation of the majority that exercises the power to appoint the 
chaplain, it seems plain to me that the designation of a member of one 
religious faith to serve as the sole official chaplain of a state legislature 
for a period of 16 years constitutes the preference of one faith over 
another in violation of the Establishment Clause of the First 
Amendment. 
Id. 
160 Marsh, 463 U.S. at 792; see also note 35 and accompanying text.  The nation’s historical 
practice of legislative prayer, as well as Nebraska’s own  century-long tradition, weighed 
heavily in favor of carving out an Establishment Clause exception for the practice: 
In light of the unambiguous and unbroken history of more than 200 
years, there can be no doubt that the practice of opening legislative 
sessions with prayer has become part of the fabric of our society. To 
invoke Divine guidance on a public body entrusted with making the 
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without applying any of the usual Establishment Clause analyses 
because the practice could not pass these tests.161  Due to this historically-
based, conclusive holding, almost all subsequent legislative prayer case 
opinions have leapt past the question of whether an opening prayer 
offered at a governmental deliberative body meeting is, in and of itself, a 
violation of the Establishment Clause.162 
But the Marsh decision did not grant governments a free pass to pray 
indiscriminately; it provided a clear delineation of who could pray and 
acknowledged acceptable content.163  Some constitutional limits to 
content have been discerned from the Court’s holding.164  The Court 
recognized that the dominance of Judeo-Christian influence greatly 
affects the actual content of the prayers, but no limits for this dominant 
theology were further defined.165  The second significant observation of 
the Court was that prayers which do not clearly proselytize, advance, or 
disparage any one faith will not be dissected because such an evaluation 
by a court would prove difficult.166  Marsh fails to define proselytizing, 
advancing, or disparaging any faith, leaving courts and responsible 
legislators attempting to adhere to the Court’s holding in Marsh without 
a bright line rule on allowable content.167 
                                                                                                             
laws is not, in these circumstances, an “establishment” of religion or a 
step toward establishment; it is simply a tolerable acknowledgment of 
beliefs widely held among the people of this country. 
Marsh, 463 U.S. at 792. 
161 See supra note 35 (detailing the Supreme Court’s choice not to apply the Lemon test or 
the endorsement test). 
162 See supra Part II.B.1 (describing the decisions in legislative prayer cases since the Marsh 
decision). 
163 See supra note 43 and accompanying text (quoting the Allegheny decision’s reference to 
the Marsh holding). 
164 See supra text accompanying note 39 (discussing the lack of necessity to address the 
content in Marsh because the prayers in question were not proselytizing). 
165 Marsh, 463 U.S. at 793.  There is only one mention in the opinion of the Judeo-
Christian tradition in which the prayers in the Nebraska Legislature are offered, but a 
footnote to the simple acknowledgement may give some insight: “[The chaplain] 
characterizes his prayers as ‘nonsectarian,’ ‘Judeo Christian,’ and with ‘elements of the 
American civil religion. . . .   Although some of his earlier prayers were often explicitly 
Christian, [he] removed all references to Christ after a 1980 complaint from a Jewish 
legislator.”  Marsh, 463 U.S. at 793 n.14 (citations omitted). 
166 See Marsh, 463 U.S. at 795 (“[I]t is not for us to embark on a sensitive evaluation or to 
parse the content of a particular prayer.”). 
167 See, e.g., Pelphrey, 410 F. Supp. 2d at 1330; Wynne, 376 F.3d 292.  But see supra note 116 
(describing Speaker Bosma’s refusal to censor prayers of prayer-givers). 
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B. Marsh Exception Limited to State Legislative Prayer Practice 
The Supreme Court’s conclusive finding that state legislative prayer 
is within Establishment Clause bounds due to the history and tradition 
of such prayer has been interpreted broadly.168  Courts apply Marsh in 
case after case as a blanket exception, allowing prayer by local 
governmental entities.169  But the Marsh opinion can also be narrowly 
read to apply only to state legislatures, thus creating the confusion 
apparent in Tangipahoa Parish.170 
Legislative prayer takes place in an almost exclusively adult 
environment which results in constitutional analysis much different than 
other public prayer cases.171  Yet the adult environment of legislative 
prayer does not follow the analysis of other adult-implicated 
Establishment Clause doctrines, otherwise the results would be vastly 
different.172 
Courts frequently use the Lemon test to decide Establishment Clause 
cases, including adult prayer situations.173  Applying the test’s three 
prongs to any legislative prayer challenge would quickly determine the 
prayers to be unconstitutional.174  The first prong of Lemon requires the 
court to determine whether the government action has a secular 
purpose.175  Marsh discussed how the practice quieted down the 
legislative members and signaled the opening of business, but this 
                                                 
168 See Marsh, 463 U.S. 783 (describing the historical tradition of paid legislative 
chaplains). 
169 See supra Part II.B.1. 
170 See supra notes 135-37 (detailing the three opinions published by the three-judge panel 
of the Fifth Circuit). 
171 See Tangipahoa Parish I, 2005 WL 517341 at *9; Tangipahoa Parish II, 477 F.3d at 211.  But 
see Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (establishing the coercion test through the finding 
that prayers at public school graduations are inherently coercive because there is great 
pressure on students to attend their graduation ceremonies and to not leave during the 
prayer). 
172 See supra note 35.  See, e.g., Ashley M. Bell, “God Save This Honorable Court”: How 
Current Establishment Clause Jurisprudence Can Be Reconciled With the Secularization of 
Historical Religious Expressions, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 1273, 1320 (2001) (concluding that many 
historical religious expressions used in government would be deemed unconstitutional 
under the regular Establishment Clause tests). 
173 See, e.g., supra note 83 and accompanying text (discussing use of Lemon test to evaluate 
adult prayer in Coles). 
174 See Marsh, 463 U.S. at 800-01 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“In sum, I have no doubt that, if 
any group of law students were asked to apply the principles of Lemon to the question of 
legislative prayer, they would nearly unanimously find the practice to be 
unconstitutional.”). 
175 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13. 
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notion was dismissed because there are many other available methods of 
calling a body to order.176  Second, Lemon requires the court to consider 
whether the principal or primary effect of the government action either 
advances or inhibits religion.177  Spending taxpayer funds in an effort to 
finance a regular practice, which repeatedly puts forth a Judeo-Christian 
belief system, clearly advances religion.178  Finally, under Lemon the court 
must ascertain whether the government action causes excessive 
entanglement with religion.179   Funding of the prayer practice as well as 
monitoring or overseeing the practice, for example, qualify as 
government entanglement with religion.180  Simply put, due to the fact 
that legislative prayer cannot survive the Lemon test, another test is 
needed in order to control the historical prayer practice.181   
The coercion test is a reflection of the accommodation theory of the 
Establishment Clause, whereby the government only violates the clause 
if it coerces religious participation.182  Predicting its application to 
legislative prayer is difficult because there is not one accepted standard 
for what constitutes coercion.183  A strong contingent of 
accommodationists believe that coercion only exists where there is actual 
coercion of religious orthodoxy and of financial support by force of law 
and threat of penalty.184  The idea of subtle coercion recognizes that 
feelings of isolation and discomfort in situations where there is social 
pressure to attend and witness prayer can constitute government 
                                                 
176 See supra note 111 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (discussing the secular purposes offered for 
opening prayers in the Nebraska Legislature). 
177 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13. 
178 See, e.g., Chambers v. Marsh, 675 F.2d 228, 234 (8th Cir. 1982) (“The primary effect of 
the practice as a whole is unmistakably to advance religion and to give preference to one 
religious view.  The state has placed its official seal of approval on one religious view for 
sixteen years and has stood behind that seal with its funds. . .”). 
179 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13. 
180 Marsh, 483 U.S. at 798-99 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
181 See supra note 174.  In fact, the first point made in Marsh acknowledged that the lower 
court had applied the Lemon test resulting in the prayer practice failing all three prongs.  
Marsh, 483 U.S. at 786 (“Applying the three-part  test  . . . the court held that the chaplaincy 
practice violated all three elements of the test. . . .”). 
182 See Weisman, 505 U.S. at 577 (establishing the coercion test through the finding that 
prayers at public school graduations are inherently coercive because there is great pressure 
on students to attend their graduation ceremonies and to not leave during the prayer). 
183 Compare Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (finding a coercive environment at public middle and 
high school graduation ceremonies that include prayer); with Mellen, 327 F.3d 355 
(discussing the coercive environment at a military college with supper prayer practice). 
184 Weisman, 505 U.S. at 631 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Establishment Clause must be 
construed in light of the government policies of accommodation, acknowledgment, and 
support for religion [that] are an accepted part of our political and cultural heritage.”) 
(internal citation omitted). 
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coercion to participate in religious activity.185  This Note suggests that the 
subtle coercion theory is applicable to local legislative and deliberative 
bodies’ prayer practices.186 
While not a singular Establishment Clause doctrine, the huge 
deference to history and tradition is an important consideration in 
attempting to clarify the outcome of legislative prayer cases.187  Some 
argue that allowing government to accommodate religion due to 
tradition inevitably leads to subtle favoritism for religious majorities 
and, unfortunately, subtle disapproval towards religious minorities.188  
Despite such concerns, a heavy reliance on deference to history and 
tradition begs the question:  How long must a practice exist to be 
deemed traditional?189  Surely the 188-year tradition of an opening 
invocation at the Indiana House of Representatives is long enough to 
sway a judge.190  But what of the Tangipahoa Parish School Board’s 
thirty-three year old practice? 
Legislative bodies would be better able to solemnize appropriate 
occasions with prayer while avoiding conflict with a clarification of the 
current legislative prayer doctrine.191  The Marsh holding fails to give 
consistent guidance, as demonstrated by the recent ambiguities that have 
arisen in recent lower court cases.192  Taking advantage of these 
ambiguities, some political groups are pushing to expand the mix of 
Christian beliefs into governmental functions.193  Part IV of this Note 
proposes a refining of the legislative prayer doctrine of Marsh, 
suggesting a clearer directive regarding the allowable content of 
                                                 
185 See id. 
186 See infra Part IV (suggesting a two-pronged judicial doctrine mandating all prayer 
content be nonsectarian and a narrowing of the Marsh/Allegheny application to only large, 
impersonal legislative sessions). 
187 See Marsh, 463 U.S. at 783. 
188 See id. 
189 See supra note 38 (discussing the recent Supreme Court decision in Van Orden v. Perry 
swinging on Justice Brennan’s heavy reliance tradition in allowing the continuous and 
unchallenged display of the Ten Commandments outside of the Texas Statehouse for over 
forty years to remain). 
190 See, e.g., Marsh, 463 U.S. at 784. 
191 See generally supra Part III (discussing the limits of the application of Marsh). 
192 See, e.g., supra notes 135-37 and accompanying text (discussing the Fifth Circuit’s 
decision in Tangipahoa Parish, which generated three opinions from the three-judge panel). 
193 See supra notes 118-22 and accompanying text (discussing the legislative reaction to 
Hinrichs); see also supra notes 141-42 and accompanying text (discussing the legislative 
reaction to Tangipahoa Parish and the announcement of the American Values Agenda). 
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government prayers and restricting the application of Marsh to state 
legislative bodies.194 
IV.  CLEAR LIMITS FOR LEGISLATIVE PRAYER 
It is necessary to resolve the uncertainties in the application of Marsh 
to deliberative body prayer practices for several basic policy reasons.  
First, the cases that arise from the ambiguity waste time and money.195  
Second, these cases are simply divisive.196  Those in the minority are 
made to feel excluded, and worse, often harassed when challenging the 
majority.197  Hinrichs, a lobbyist, lost his job as a result of pursuing his 
case against the Indiana prayer practice.198  In the aftermath of the Does’ 
complaint, a student teacher in the Tangipahoa Parish School system 
who reported prayer activities in the school was given a failing grade.199  
Such discord resulting from religious diversity is exactly what the 
Establishment Clause was meant to avoid.200 
With the presidential and legislative political trends of the past 
decade, the agenda of the conservative, religious electorate has been 
brought to the forefront of government policy.201  These aspirations have 
a natural consequence of bringing about a spate of cases involving the 
Religion Clauses.202  Since Marsh, all of the challenges brought regarding 
legislative prayer, until Hinrichs, have arisen from local government 
actions.203  These challenges were decided using Marsh as the model.204  
With Hinrichs, the limited holding in Marsh resulted in confusion and 
controversy with state-level legislative prayer content.205  Tangipahoa 
Parish underscores the question of the breadth of the legislative prayer 
                                                 
194 See infra Part IV.A. 
195 See, e.g., supra notes 118-121 (discussing legislative reactions to Hinrichs); supra notes 
139-40 (discussing costs of the legal battle in Tangipahoa Parish). 
196 See, e.g., supra notes 125-27 (discussing the ongoing controversies for the past decade 
over prayer in Tangipahoa Parish). 
197 See Engel, 370 U.S. at 431 (“When the power, prestige and financial support of 
government is placed behind a particular religious belief, the indirect coercive pressure 
upon religious minorities to conform to the prevailing officially approved religion is 
plain.”). 
198 See supra note 106. 
199 See supra note 138. 
200 See supra Part II.A (discussing the Establishment Clause’s adoption by the First 
Congress). 
201 See Balkin & Levinson, supra note 64, at 515-16. 
202 See id. at 516. 
203 See supra Part II.B.1 (discussing legislative prayer decisions). 
204 See supra Part II.B.1 (discussing application of the Marsh/Allegheny doctrine). 
205 See supra Part II.C.1 (discussing the Hinrichs case). 
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exception, whether it includes deliberative bodies other than a state 
legislature.206  Hinrichs and Tangipahoa Parish signal that the 
jurisprudence of Marsh has reached its practical limits.207 
A. Model Judicial Reasoning for Legislative Prayer 
The first prong of this proposed legislative prayer doctrine would 
simply regard any sectarian prayers to be unconstitutional.   A case by 
case determination of whether prayer content  qualifies as proselytizing 
is too difficult when dealing with a written record rather than actually 
witnessing the invocation’s delivery.208  Moreover, all subjectivity would 
be eliminated as to when content crosses the line into proselytizing by 
simply concentrating on the sectarian notion.  No threat of proselyzation 
exists if prayers remain completely non-sectarian.209 
The second prong of this proposed legislative prayer doctrine is that 
the state legislative model should not be extended to apply to lower level 
legislative bodies.  The decision in Marsh was specific to a state 
legislature, and this proposal would limit its application accordingly.  
Marsh is based on the specific facts of the prayer practice in the Nebraska 
legislature, including:  the unique history of prayer in state legislative 
bodies; the large size of such groups; and the allowance of individuals 
coming and going throughout the session.210  Local government entities 
and deliberative bodies, therefore, should receive a different analysis.211  
The tests applied to other adult prayer situations, the Lemon test and the 
theory of subtle coercion, would be more appropriately applied to prayer 
offered at local legislative meetings akin to school board, town hall, or 
county council meetings.212 
B. Commentary on the Application of Proposed Limits to Legislative Prayer 
Application of the first prong, strictly limiting prayer to nonsectarian 
content, is simple and straightforward.  Invocations to a divine being, 
                                                 
206 See supra Part II.C.2 (discussing the Tangipahoa Parish case). 
207 See supra Parts II.C.1, II.C.2 (discussing the Hinrichs and Tangipahoa Parish cases). 
208 See supra Part II.B.1 (discussing cases decided using Marsh/Allegheny content analysis 
and their subsequent inconsistencies). 
209 See supra Part III.A (discussing content limitations of Marsh/Allegheny doctrine). 
210 See supra notes 35-40 and accompanying text (discussing Marsh holding). 
211 See supra Part II.B.2 (discussing the constitutional evaluation of adult prayer 
situations). 
212 See supra Part II.B.2 (discussing the constitutional evaluation of adult prayer 
situations). 
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without reference to a specific religion, would be permitted.213  In most 
situations, courts deciding controversies and, usually, the legislative 
bodies themselves, are already following the spirit of Marsh/Allegheny by 
avoiding even specifically Christian references.214  Rare are the renegades 
who focus in on the dicta of Marsh which suggests an aversion to parsing 
the language of prayers and attempt to impose sectarian prayers when 
government is the speaker.215  However, a Supreme Court decision 
elevating the spirit of nonsectarian prayer from Marsh into a clear 
constitutional command would relieve our legislatures, and 
subsequently, our courtrooms, of the debate over content.216 
While the Lemon test is the standard Establishment Clause judicial 
doctrine, it is often difficult to apply to legislative prayer and would 
almost uniformly reject such practice as unconstitutional.217  The 
consideration of historical tradition is reasonable, but no clear 
parameters exist defining just how long a time period justifies a prayer 
practice.218  However, the theory of subtle coercion can be applied to 
legislative prayer situations involving local legislative bodies.219  
Although the citizens attending such meetings are generally adults as 
opposed to the primary and secondary students involved in the 
doctrine’s inception, the role of citizens attending local government 
meetings differs greatly from the usual adult prayer case contexts.220  
Unlike attendance at a public university graduation, where all attendees 
are unified in celebration, the reality of attendance at a local government 
meeting usually includes the existence of an adversarial or supplicant 
                                                 
213 See supra text accompanying notes 54-56 (giving a summation of how references to 
Christ advance one particular faith). 
214 See supra Part II.B.1 (discussing the application of Marsh/Allegheny in legislative 
prayer cases). 
215 See, e.g., supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text (discussing Pelphrey); Part II.C.1 
(discussing the facts of Hinrichs). 
216 Currently the Seventh Circuit decision in Hinrichs is pending, while the School Board 
of Tangipahoa Parish is seeking further appeal.  See supra Part II.C. 
217 See supra notes 173-81 and accompanying text (analyzing application of the Lemon test 
to legislative prayer). 
218 See supra notes 187-90 and accompanying text (discussing consideration of history and 
tradition in Establishment Clause decisions). 
219 See supra notes 84-89 and accompanying text (discussing application of subtle coercion 
in Mellen); see also supra notes 182-86 and accompanying text (analyzing use of coercion test 
and recognizing the feelings of discomfort, isolation, and social pressure to participate in 
certain government prayer activities). 
220 See, e.g., supra note 80-83 and accompanying text (discussing the use of prayer at a 
school board meeting); supra notes 129-30 and accompanying text (discussing the 
attendance at the Tangipahoa Parish school board meetings). 
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relationship.221  Furthermore, unlike at the state or national legislative 
levels where the average citizen is only present for an opening 
invocation in a singular or sporadic observance of his government or as a 
function of employment, at the local level a citizen is usually present at a 
government meeting to accomplish a goal.222  This difference in purpose 
creates a difference in the effect of the prayer on those attending, 
magnifying feelings of isolation and discouraging participation from a 
citizen who is a religious minority.223  Simply narrowing the Marsh 
legislative prayer exception to apply only to state legislatures, and not to 
lower government deliberative bodies, would spare those who practice 
faiths outside the Christian majority from remaining religiously 
segregated and allow those citizens to feel fully involved in their local 
government.224 
V.  CONCLUSION 
We look forward to the day when all nations and all 
people of the earth will have the opportunity to hear and 
respond to messages of love of the Almighty God who has 
revealed Himself in the saving power of Jesus Christ.225 
A Supreme Court decision in either Hinrichs or Tangipahoa Parish 
would clarify the boundaries of permissible legislative prayer.  In fact, 
the two cases decided in tandem could solve both of the ambiguities of 
the Marsh doctrine identified in this Note.  The judicial reasoning 
proposed in Part IV provides a method by which a court may resolve 
both cases in a just manner. 
                                                 
221 Compare supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text (discussing prayer at university 
functions in Tanford and Chaudhuri); with supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text 
(discussing prayer at local school board meeting in Coles). 
222 Compare supra Part II.A (discussing the history of legislative prayer up to and 
including the Marsh/Allegheny decisions); with supra Part II.B.2 (discussing adult prayer in 
non-legislative situations). 
223 See supra Part III.B (discussing the evaluation of adult prayer through alternative 
methods, including the coercion test). 
224 See supra Part III.B (discussing the evaluation of adult prayer through alternative 
methods, including the coercion test). 
225 Hinrichs, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 1107 (quoting opening prayer asking for worldwide 
conversion to Christianity from March 28, 2005).  While arguably proselytizing as 
delivered, this prayer would be acceptable in the Indiana House of Representatives with 
only the reference to “Almighty God,” but fails the suggested test due to the phrase which 
follows this supreme deity reference, which makes the prayer clearly Christian and 
sectarian. 
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By applying the bright-line rule of allowing only non-sectarian 
prayer, the District Court decision in Hinrichs v. Bosma would be 
affirmed.  Any and all references to Christianity would remain 
forbidden, just as the current injunction dictates.  The Speaker would be 
forced to carry on with the business of legislating for the state, rather 
than spending time and money to assert Christian religious beliefs that 
the vast majority of Hoosiers adhere to already.   
Recognizing that the Marsh prayer exception was intended to apply 
narrowly to state legislatures and that the dynamic is drastically 
different at local government levels, the District Court decision in Doe v. 
Tangipahoa Parish School Board would also be affirmed.  Whether through 
application of the Lemon test or the theory that subtle coercion exists at 
local government meetings, the thirty-three years of government prayer 
at the School Board meetings would come to a permanent halt.  The 
residents of Tangipahoa Parish would be able to put their tax dollars to 
work educating their children, rather than defending the religious 
practice that they are free to carry out in private.   
Future disputes involving legislative prayer would simply pass 
Establishment Clause muster if the legislative body is at the state or 
national level, and the prayer’s content is non-sectarian.  Just as Justice 
Brennan’s dissent in Marsh mused that any law student would find 
legislative prayer to fail the Lemon test, this two-pronged test would 
easily identify allowable legislative prayer.  Such a clear test would 
eliminate the bounty of cases and controversies arising in this branch of 
constitutional jurisprudence.  The Christian majority needs this 
clarification; that what it deems “just a little talk with Jesus” is a 
violation of the First Amendment whenever government is the speaker. 
Anne Abrell226 
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